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“Suez was . . . a crossroads from which everybody drove off in wrong
directions, the Americans as much as the British and the French, and the Arabs
as well as the Israelis.”1
INTRODUCTION
A.

A War of Self-Defense?

Suez was a war of choice. The first step to start such a war begins with the
domestic constitutional process. The mobilized constitutional regime of a
country drives diplomatic action and military planning, as well as the
consciousness of the body politic, into a conclusion that war is the preferred
solution. In Long Wars and the Constitution2 and in War Powers,3 Stephen M.
Griffin and Mariah Zeisberg respectively devote their considerable scholarly
skills to analyze the historical and normative aspects of the American
constitutional regime of War Powers. Both Griffin and Zeisberg highlight the
interaction between the executive and legislative branches under the American
constitution.4 Both explore the explicit power of Congress to declare war
against the long U.S. experience of heavy executive involvement in opening a
war as well as executing it.5 Griffin and Zeisberg do not address the option of
deploying the same constitutional processes for the purpose of avoiding a war
altogether.6 Nor do they address the perspective of comparative constitutional
law, i.e., how other countries activate their constitutional regimes for the
purpose of starting a war. In this Article I introduce these missing aspects.
Thus, I add dimensions to Griffin and Zeisberg’s excellent books, using the
events surrounding the Suez War to provide a comparative analysis of different
constitutional regimes and their interplay with diplomacy.

* The author wishes to thank Prof. Ari Afilalo, Professor Vernon Bogdanor, Amalya
Schreier, Elizabeth Nagle, Caleb French, Thomas Turlin, Andrew Smith, Rivka Brot, Eitan
Rom, James Wray Miller, Gabriela Morales, members of the legal history workshop at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, and members of the legal history workshop at
Harvard Law School.
1 MARTIN WOOLLACOTT, AFTER SUEZ: ADRIFT IN THE AMERICAN CENTURY 4 (2006).
2 STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013).
3 MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 5
(2013).
4 See id. at 222 (“The pattern that the Constitution sets in its war politics is not unique.
The Constitution does not draw clear boundaries between legislative and executive powers
in a variety of policy areas.”).
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
6 ZEISBERG, supra note 3, at 21 (“While the Constitution’s allocation of the authority to
make war seems to call for some important distinctions, war, repelling attack and defensive
actions are capacious categories whose meaning must be politically constructed.”).
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The Suez War, a war of choice launched simultaneously by the United
Kingdom, France, and Israel against the expressed opposition of U.S. president
Dwight Eisenhower, affected international relations and shaped American
foreign policy into our own age.7 I briefly review how the constitutional
regimes of the three countries were mobilized to provide the legal cover for the
war. I then discuss the constitutional powers used by President Eisenhower to
thwart the plans of the three countries. The President of the United States was
not willing to go to war and at the same time invoked his considerable Article
II powers to subvert the plans of the other three.8 We thus have an interesting
case of a crisis in international relations: three countries (one small emerging
nation and two European powers, one of which, Britain, has been a close ally
of the United States) mobilize their constitutional regimes to launch a war,
while the fourth country mobilizes its own constitutional regime to undermine
the war efforts and the gains expected to be reaped by the belligerents. The
results of these constitutional and political maneuvers had mighty
consequences for the world as we know it today.
B.

Motives of the Belligerents

On October 29, 1956, Israel launched war against Egypt by invading the
Sinai Peninsula.9 Two days later the French and British governments issued an
ultimatum masked as an appeal to both Egypt and Israel to stay clear ten miles
of the Suez Canal.10 They then deployed their military forces to occupy the

7

See STEVEN Z. FREIBERGER, DAWN OVER SUEZ (1992) (detailing how the collusion
between Britain, France, and Israel in the Suez Crisis was a “turning point” in the break
between the United States and Britain, and further led to the United States’ growing
involvement in the Middle East).
8 DAVID A. NICHOLS, EISENHOWER 1956: THE PRESIDENT’S YEAR OF CRISIS -- SUEZ AND
THE BRINK OF WAR 217-67 (2011) (describing the fervent opposition of President
Eisenhower to military engagement in Suez and the broad actions taken to compel
withdrawal, including cessation of economic, military, and financial assistance); see also
FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 189 (“Upon learning of the Israeli attack Eisenhower was firm
in his belief that American and British prestige were at stake. He considered it imperative
for both nations to honor their pledge given to Israel and the Arab states in the spring:
Western support against outside aggression.”).
9 Id. at 187 (“After two weeks of Israeli military action designed to suggest an imminent
attack against Jordan, on October 29, 1956, Israeli paratroopers were dropped deep into the
Sinai Desert.”).
10 Id. (“The British reminded the Egyptian government that according to the 1954 Suez
Canal base agreement they had the right to intervene if Egypt was attacked. Accordingly, on
October 30 Britain and France delivered an ultimatum calling for an end to the fighting and
warning Egypt to withdraw to a position ten miles from the canal.” (citation omitted)). The
ultimatum was termed an appeal out of deference to Israel because, in fact, Israel was a
partner of these two powers rather than an adversary as Egypt was. An ultimatum is a term
of art in international law. Avoiding the term was one of the techniques of double speak
deployed by the European powers. See id. (“Nasser refused, informing the British

1300

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1297

Canal Zone.11 The United Kingdom and France attempted to regain control of
the Canal, previously nationalized by Egypt, and simultaneously to orchestrate
a regime change in Cairo.
It would be hard to argue that this was a war of self-defense, and therefore
legitimate under the Charter of the United Nations.12 More plausibly, it was a
preventive war, aimed at restoring the hegemony of the European powers over
Egypt and vicariously, over the Middle East.13 Israel was in a somewhat
different situation. Located in the Middle-East and rejected by its neighbors, it
harbored legitimate and serious grievances against Egypt: organized terrorist
raids into its territory from the Gaza strip, Egypt’s closure of the Canal as well
as the Straits of Tiran to Israeli navigation, and Gamal Abdel Nasser’s (Egypt’s
leader) inflammatory rhetoric promising the annihilation of the state.14 Still,
Israeli leaders did understand that while serious, without more these grievances
could not provide a valid reason to open war.15 Israel’s invasion came as a
result of an agreement between itself and the two European powers.16 The
Europeans were looking for a “pretext” to launch a war.17 The plan cooked in
ambassador . . . that ‘since the Israelis were the aggressors . . . the British and French stand,
consisting of the ultimatum and imminent occupation, was an act of aggression against
Egyptian rights and dignity and against the Charter of the United Nations.’”).
11 Id. at 188 (“At dusk on October 31 British and French planes began bombing Egyptian
positions.”).
12 See Pnina Lahav, A Small Nation Goes to War: Israel's Cabinet Authorization of the
1956 War, 15 ISRAEL STUDIES 61, 64 (“Israel was a party to the UN charter, which outlawed
war except for self-defense or pursuant to UNSC (UN Security Council) approval.”).
13 See id. at 64-65 (contrasting the Suez War as a “war of aggression” as compared to the
1948 War of Independence, a war of self-defense).
14 See id. at 66 (outlining David Ben-Gurion’s casus belli to justify military action,
which included violations of international resolutions and terrorist raids in Israeli territory
organized by Egyptian forces).
15 See id. at 65 (“Clearly, the [Israeli] cabinet was well aware of the nature of the motion
and its grave international ramifications, and was willing to confront the harsh reality. Even
those who urged avoiding the terms initiated or preventive war understood that it would
likely be interpreted as such, and worried about being labeled as aggressors.”). The U.N.
Charter prohibits wars of aggression and permits only wars of self-defense. But who decides
which is which? There has never been a consensus about the proper name for the Suez War.
Most refer to it as “the Suez Crisis.” The British called it “Operation Musketeer.” The
French called it “L’expedition de Suez.” CHRISTIAN PINEAU, 1956, SUEZ (1976). The Israelis
call it the “Sinai Campaign” or the Kadesh campaign. The reason is clear: none wanted the
action to fall under the category of “war” and risk being labeled as violators of the U.N.
Charter. After all, both England and France were permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council, charged with ensuring the integrity and normative power of the fledgling
organization and its Charter, which they themselves helped draft.
16 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
17 KEITH KYLE, SUEZ 320 (1991) (“[British leaders] insisted that it would be essential for
Britain that Israel carry out a ‘real act of war,’ so as to avoid any danger of Britain being
thought aggressor by Commonwealth and Scandinavian friends when she took action in
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Paris and adopted by London was as follows: Israel would invade the Sinai and
the United Kingdom and France would pretend to be alarmed and enter the
fray in order to restore the peace.
Just three months earlier, in July 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s
charismatic president, had nationalized the Suez Canal, one of the last vestiges
of colonial power in the Middle East, and a vital maritime connection between
Asia and the Mediterranean.18 The move alarmed the United Kingdom, the
response. The pretext must be credible.”); see also MICHAEL J. TURNER, BRITISH POWER AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DURING THE 1950S 227 (2009) (“The Suez crisis had many
causes, including Britain’s wish to maintain a strong presence in the Middle East, the mutual
hostility between Britain and Egypt, and the lack of confidence between Britain and the
United States and Britain and France.”).
18
The decree offered compensation for shares in accordance with their value on the Paris
Stock Exchange on the day preceding the effective date of the decree. See U.S. Dep’t of
State, The Suez Canal Problem: July 26-September 22, 1956 30-32 (1956) (“Stockholders
and holders of founders shares shall be compensated for the ordinary or founders shares they
own in accordance with the value of the shares shown in the closing quotations of the Paris
Stock Exchange on the day preceding the effective date of the present law.”). This action cut
short the concession agreement of 1866, under which the Company had the right to operate
the Canal until 1968. Id. at 9-16 (delineating the terms of the Convention Between the
Viceroy of Egypt and the Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company).
Great Britain, France, and the United States protested that the nationalization violated
international law and issued a statement on August 2, recognizing Egypt’s general right to
nationalize, yet maintaining that the international character of the Suez Canal Company
made it immune from nationalization. Id. at 34-35 (“In 1888 all the Great Powers then
principally concerned with the international character of the Canal and its free, open and
secure use without discrimination joined in the Treaty and Convention of Constantinople.”)
The western powers’ claim relied in large part on the Constantinople Convention of 1888.
Id. at 16-20 (“Convention Between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and Turkey, Respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez
Maritime Canal”), which guaranteed the freedom and security of the Canal, and which the
western powers later alleged had incorporated the Suez Canal Company’s concession. Id. at
72-73 (“Thus the decree of February 22nd, 1866 certifying the convention of that date
between the Government of Egypt and the Universal Suez Canal Company has been by
reference incorporated into and made part of what is called the definite system set up by the
1888 treaty.”). Egypt argued that it did not violate the Constantinople convention because
section 14 of the convention provided that “the engagements resulting from the present
treaty shall not be limited by the duration of the acts of concession of the Universal Suez
Canal Company.” Id. at 20. Therefore, the guarantee of free navigation would become the
responsibility of Egypt at the end of the concession. Another argument advanced by the
western powers was that The Suez Company or the Canal itself had a special international
status exempting them from Egypt’s jurisdiction or from the general right to nationalize.
Robert Delson, Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company: Issues of Public and Private
International Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 755, 771-75 (1957) (“The opponents of
nationalization apparently argue that even were the right of nationalization not precluded by
incorporation of the concession into the Constantinople Convention, or by the international
public character of the Company, it would still be precluded because the
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dominant colonial power in the Middle East up to and during WWII.19 France
shared Britain’s concerns, but experienced a more immediate distress: Algeria
was agitating for independence from French rule, and the Algerian rebels were
supported and encouraged by Egypt’s government.20 To make matters worse,
the Cold War was casting a dark shadow over world affairs.21 Nasser had just
‘internationalization’ of the canal waters subjects the canal to continued operation by the
Company or some other international agency.” (citation omitted)); see also Note,
Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, 70 HARV. L. REV. 480, 485-86 (1957) (“[T]he
argument has been advanced that, even in the absence of treaty restrictions, there is an
exception to the general right of a state to nationalize when a utility of vital importance to
the international community is operated by a private company under a concession.”).
Egypt further argued that there was no international legal basis for asserting that such
right of passage could be guaranteed only by the Company, but Egypt never denied its
intention to deny Israel the right of free passage. Whether or not the nationalization was
recognized as valid under international law, Egypt’s offer of compensation was probably
insufficient under the majority view of the time. See e.g., Delson, supra at 767 (“With
respect to Egypt's obligation to pay compensation for the Suez Canal nationalization, even if
it is assumed that the Company was an Egyptian one, its shares were owned by foreigners,
and hence the states whose citizens owned such shares may assert a claim against Egypt
under public international law for compensation for the nationalization.”).
In addition, the offer of compensation was to be paid only after the foreign assets of the
company were turned over, which was, from the beginning, unlikely ever to occur. Egypt
argued, and at least one scholar agreed, that the validity of the nationalization was not
conditioned on whether legal compensation was provided. See id. at 764 (“The sounder
view . . . would appear to be that the validity of the nationalization is not conditioned upon
whether legal, or any, compensation is provided for.”). If the nationalization were found to
be illegal under international law (e.g., because it violated a treaty), Egypt would have been
obliged to make full reparation, which may have included expectancy damages. See Note,
supra at 480 (“Should the matter come in any form before the International Court of Justice
or an arbitral tribunal, and should it be decided that Egypt's action was illegal, the tribunal
might require the payment of full expectancy damages rather than the more limited
compensation that Egypt is now offering.”). What was highly unlikely ever to occur was
specific reparation, or the return of operational rights to the Suez Canal Company, which is
presumably why even the U.S. accepted the nationalization as a fait accompli in trying to
find a way forward at the Users’ Conference. The right of a state to nationalize foreign
property within its territory was broadly recognized by the mid-1950s, “unless forbidden by
treaty stipulations, or otherwise violative of international law, as in a discriminatory taking
or a taking of property or of an entity which is immune from nationalization.” Delson, supra
at 762.
19 TURNER, supra note 17, at 229 (noting that the British media accused Nasser of an “act
international brigandage”).
20 See FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 163 (“Angered over Nasser’s increasing presence in
North Africa, particularly in Algeria, the French saw the nationalization of the canal as an
opportunity to destroy the Egyptian leader once and for all.” (citation omitted)).
21 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 30 (“[W]ith the way the ‘cold war’ was developing in
Europe, the overriding consideration for Britain and the United States was to ensure that, no
matter how much their analysis of the Palestine situation might differ, they must not find
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completed a large arms deal with the Soviet Union, a deal which appeared to
turn Egypt into a major military power in the Middle East, and which gave the
Soviets an important foothold in the region.22 Britain and France had a history
of colonization as well as competition for hegemony in the Middle East.23 But
now they shared grave concerns over the political and economic ramifications
of rising Arab nationalism under Nasser as well as the possibility of Soviet
ascent in the region.24 Eager to maintain their status as world powers, Britain
and France joined forces to reassert their colonial and European hegemony in
the Middle East.25
Israel—a small, poor, insecure country created only eight years prior—had
its independent grievances against Egypt, as mentioned above.26 Egypt was
Israel’s most powerful nemesis, and Israelis were convinced that a second
round of war (following the 1948 war of independence) was inevitable given
Egypt’s ongoing provocations.27 They only wondered when it would happen.
If it were up to Israel, 1956 would not be the year to start a war, but in Paris
the French military command had other plans.28 As will be discussed later,
Israel felt it should take the French offer and accepted the dictated timetable.29

themselves fighting a surrogate war against each other.”).
22 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 27 (“The arms deal was made public on September 27.
Egypt would procure Soviet-produced arms from the Czechs, in exchange for Egyptian
cotton.”); see also TURNER, supra note 17, at 228 (“The West dominated arms supplies to
the Middle East at this time. If Nasser turned for weapons to the communist bloc there
would be significant shift in the regional balance of power.”).
23 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 134 (“Britain and France had owned a controlling
interest in the Suez Canal Company . . . for decades. . . . Suez was a lifeline for Britain. . . .
Its closing would bring Britain to its knees.” (citation omitted)).
24 Id.
25 Lahav, supra note 12, at 61 (“[I]t became clear that Britain and France were Israel’s
senior partners, and that the central target of the two colonial powers was to restore their
hold over the Suez Canal.”).
26 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
27 MOTTI GOLANI, ISRAEL IN SEARCH OF A WAR: THE SINAI CAMPAIGN, 1955-1956, at ix
(1998) (“[Israeli military leaders] maintained that Israel’s survival was contingent on its
defeating Egypt, the leader of the Arab world, in a ‘second round.’ . . . The Israeli army
considered the outcome of the ‘first round’ in 1948-1949 (Israel’s War of Independence)
intolerable, a situation Israel could not live with.”).
28 See Lahav, supra note 12, at 69 (“As Ben-Gurion conceded . . . but for the allies’
intervention he would not have entertained the idea of launching war ‘tomorrow.’”). See
also Guy Laron, The 1955 Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal, the Egyptian Army, and Israeli
Intelligence, 63 THE MIDDLE EAST J. 69 (2009).
29 Id. at 81 n.6 (“Ben-Gurion knew well that his cabinet was skeptical of the idea of war .
. . . [H]e calculated that the cabinet, facing the decision to “go to war tomorrow” would
bend to pressure to approve the motion so as not to upset Britain and France . . .”).
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U.S. Reaction and Aftermath

In the context of world affairs the military invasion of Egypt came at a
particularly inopportune moment. The anxiety over the Cold War was
escalating as Hungary, behind the Iron Curtain, was signaling its desire to be
free while the Soviet government was flexing its muscle.30 Amid the gathering
storm, Dwight Eisenhower was in the final weeks of his campaign to win a
second term as President of the United States. The United Nations, designed as
a world government capable of stopping wanton war and barely a decade old,
was struggling to shape a meaningful role for itself as guardian of the rule of
international law under the UN Charter.
On October 31 and following the invasion and ultimatum, President
Eisenhower did not turn a blind eye as the parties had expected, even though
the presidential elections were less than a week away.31 Rather, he reacted
furiously and resolutely, demanding a halt to the aggression and immediate
withdrawal.32 Even though the Cold War was raging, and for reasons unrelated
to Eisenhower’s, the Soviet leadership quickly echoed his demands.33 This was
the only event in the history of the Cold War where the superpowers
collaborated in denouncing a war and insisted on the return of the status quo
ante. Meanwhile, Soviet tanks entered Budapest to crush an uprising against
the Soviet domination of Hungary.34 Thus, the denunciation of the Western
powers invading Egypt came in the midst of a serious and noisy international
turmoil about events in Hungary. In New York, Dag Hammerskjöld, Secretary
General of the United Nations, in full cooperation with Washington, insisted
on an immediate withdrawal by Israel, France, and Britain from Egyptian
soil.35 Under the pressure of international sanctions and aggressive diplomatic
American maneuvers, the three countries reluctantly agreed to a cease-fire and
to withdrawal from Suez. From this perspective, international law, as it was
30 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 3 (“While the United States emerged from [World War
II] stronger than its European allies, the Soviet Union’s postwar actions and development of
atomic weapons intensified American perceptions of a worldwide communist threat. . . .
This bundle of tensions had spawned a ‘Cold War’ almost immediately after the big war.”).
31 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 209-15 (outlining Eisenhower’s “emphatic protest” to
the British-French ultimatum); see also Lahav, supra note 12, at 74 (noting the belief that
the United States would be distracted by the upcoming Presidential election).
32 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 209-15.
33 Id. at 208 (“[T]he British and the French vetoed the American-sponsored Security
Council resolution calling for a cease-fire between Israel and Egypt. Ironically, the Soviet
Union supported the measure.”).
34 Id. at xx (“The morning of November 4, the Soviet Union had sent 200,000 troops and
four thousand tanks into Budapest, Hungary, to put down a revolt.”).
35 Id. at 247 (detailing the demands from the United Nations that “Britain, France and
Israel implement a cease-fire within twelve hours and withdraw from Egypt within three
days or be faced with the prospect of American and Soviet military assistance”). The veto
powers of Britain and France in the U.N. Security Council were of no avail as the United
States moved the deliberations to the General Assembly.
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embedded in the UN Charter, prevailed.36 But the history of the Cold War and
that of the Middle East shows that, in fact, the aftermath of these events were
replete with much violence and very little rule of law. In more than one way,
Suez was a war to make more wars.
The big losers of the Suez adventure were the United Kingdom and
France.37 Both had to abandon their dreams of restoring their colonial glory.
Among other things, they turned their energy towards the idea of a united
Europe.38 Israel, like its collaborators, also had to withdraw from Egyptian soil,
and in this sense its military victory also turned into a diplomatic defeat.39 But
unlike its senior collaborators, Israel also emerged with a few substantial gains
in hand. The Straits of Tiran, closed by Egypt to Israeli navigation were now
opened for all;40 the first international UN force was created and placed in the
Sinai Peninsula as a buffer between Egypt and Israel;41 and Israel began to
attract attention and recognition for its military capabilities.42
I. THREE COUNTRIES (PLUS ONE) GO TO WAR:
DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
A.

Egypt
1.

36

Constitutional Framework

Id.
See KYLE, supra note 17, at 549 (denoting British Prime Minister Anthony Eden the
“loser” of Suez); GOLANI, supra note 27, at 187 (“British policy in the Middle East had
sustained a series of humiliations in the early 1950s . . .”); MORDECHAI BAR-ON, THE GATES
OF GAZA: ISRAEL’S ROAD TO SUEZ AND BACK, 1955-1957, 321 (1994) (“France emerged
from the war utterly defeated; its position as a world power had been seriously assailed and
its control of North Africa was ultimately lost.”).
38 BRUNO LEPRINCE, CHRISTIAN PINEAU DE BUCHENWALD AUX TRAITES DE ROME 107
(2004).
39 See GOLANI, supra note 27, at 191 (“The Israeli withdrawal . . . was preceded by a
general decline in the euphoria which prevailed in Israeli during the war . . . . [T]he
downfall was swift and hard, and completely incomprehensible to anyone who was not
privy to the legions of secrets which surrounded this war.”).
40 Id. at 197 (“The Straits of Tiran were open to Israeli navigation and remained open
until May 1967.”); see BAR-ON, supra note 37, at 320 (“The withdrawal from the Straits of
Tiran was made conditional on formal guarantees ensuring its freedom of navigation . . .”).
41 See GOLANI, supra note 27, at 196-99 (stating that the “tranquility along Israel’s
border with Egypt” was due at least in part to “the presence of UN peacekeeping forces,”
and further explaining that “with the exception of Nasser’s downfall, Israel emerged with
everything it wanted”).
42 Id. at 196 (“Generally speaking, Israel’s value as a strategic asset in the Middle East
was at last recognised by the West.”).
37
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Though Egypt was the target of attack by Britain, France, and Israel, it is
worthwhile to take a look at the Egyptian political and constitutional scene
before discussing the three countries that initiated military engagement in
Suez. Egypt deliberately took that fateful step of nationalizing the Suez Canal
that within six months culminated in a war. What were the constitutional
mechanisms that led Egypt to nationalize the Suez Canal, thus setting in
motion the events precipitating the Suez conflict?
Egypt’s modern history was dominated by British colonial presence, with
strategic British military bases established on Egyptian soil as early as the late
19th century.43 This state of affairs was fortified by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty
of Alliance of 1936, which resulted in the presence of up to 80,000 British
military personnel in Egypt.44
Until 1952 Egypt was a monarchy with a liberal constitution modeled after
the Belgian constitution. In July 1952, a group of Egyptian military officers
overthrew the King and established Egyptian military rule.45 Of these officers
the most charismatic and ambitious was Gamal Abdel Nasser. By 1954 he
appointed himself prime minister and by 1956 he introduced a new constitution
stipulating a one party rule in Egypt. In the June 1956 elections he was the
only candidate for president and won by a resounding landslide.46 Now Nasser
was in full control of both domestic and foreign affairs. Soon he would become
leader of the Arab world and a welcomed figure among the non-aligned
nations.47 Nasser harbored considerable hostility against the Western powers,
especially against Britain. He often spoke of a “hateful trinity” comprised of
“social injustice, political oppression, and British occupation.”48
2.

The Road to War

The decision to nationalize the canal was met with a wave of enthusiastic
support in Egypt as well as in the larger Arab world.49 From the perspective of
43 KIRK J. BEATTIE, EGYPT DURING THE NASSER YEARS: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND CIVIL
SOCIETY 18 (1994) (“Great Britain’s occupation began in 1882, and although Egypt gained
formal independence in 1922, the continued presence of British administrative advisers and
troops severely curtailed Egyptian sovereignty.”).
44 JAMES JANKOWSKI, NASSER’S EGYPT, ARAB NATIONALISM, AND THE UNITED ARAB
REPUBLIC 12 (2002) (“The British position was put on a more formal basis in 1936 with the
conclusion of an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance that linked Egypt and Great Britain in a
twenty-year alliance, thereby regularizing but also perpetuating the positioning of British
military forces in Egypt.”).
45 See id. at 14-19 (describing the “Free Officers Movement” which overthrew the
monarchy and became the governing authority in Egypt in 1952).
46 See id. at 65-70 (describing Nasser’s ascent to political power).
47 See id.
48 See id. at 42.
49 Id. (“Nasser’s announcement . . . stunned but also electrified the huge crowd present at
his addresss; he received a spontaneous ovation, which in the view of one observer reached
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constitutional design, the important point was that Nasser’s decision was
unitary. He did not consult any other institution in Egypt, including his own
cabinet.50 Even the Egyptian Foreign Minister was not consulted.51 Thus this
decision, which constituted the single event triggering the War of 1956 and
which was characterized as the “most dramatic [Egyptian] foreign policy
decision of the mid 1950’s,”52 was taken by one man, with neither checks nor
balances. Egypt’s rulers made many statements concerning their devotion to
the [Arab, Egyptian] public interest and their commitment to the welfare of the
people.53 They also enjoyed considerable popular support.54 But Egypt’s rulers
were new in their job—Nasser seized power the same year—and Egypt had no
tradition of parliamentary rule and little solid administrative law to channel and
process political decisions.55 The actual decision to nationalize and thereafter
to escalate the diplomatic confrontation, even to risk war, was made by Gamal
Abdel Nasser alone, rather speedily and without collective deliberation.56
Would the war have taken place without Nasser’s nationalization of the
canal? Perhaps. France and Israel had independent reasons to unsettle Nasser.
Still, France was eager to have Britain on its side, and it is very questionable
whether Britain would have gone to war if nationalization did not take place.
Following WWII, the Suez War was the first instance in which Britain acted in
opposition to an express U.S. wish in such critical matters as war and peace.57
It is doubtful that Prime Minister Anthony Eden would have taken such an
unconventional step if he did not believe that the challenge to the British
national interest should be squarely met.58
‘hysteria levels.’” (citation omitted)).
50 Id. (“The later testimony of Nasser’s associates is unanimous in that the most dramatic
foreign policy decision of the mid-1950’s, the nationalization of the Suez Canal in July
1956, was Nasser’s decision alone, revealed to the cabinet only to the surprise, and in some
cases, the consternation of its members.”).
51 Id. (“Foreign Minister Mahmud Fawzi was a ‘respected technician’ who had ‘only a
small role as policy maker.’”).
52 Id. at 67.
53 See BEATTIE, supra note 43, at 117 (describing Arab nationalism as a “key ideal of the
Nasser regime”).
54 See id. at 116 (“[The] assertion of national independence and open defiance of the
[West] . . . earned Nasser tremendous popularity in Egypt and the Arab world. Indeed, his
spurning of Western threats with his own verbal taunts sent much of the public into gleeful
delirium.”).
55 See id. at 142 (describing the implementation of new policies as an exercise of
“learning by trial and error”).
56 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
57 See FREIBERGER, supra note 7, 159-86 (outlining the deteroriation of the AngloAmerican alliance); W. SCOTT LUCAS, DIVIDED WE STAND (1991).
58 See FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 161 (“The British reaction to nationalization of the
canal was predictable. After meeting with American and French officials, Eden immediately
summoned his cabinet. They characterized Nasser’s act as a callous betrayal of the Suez
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The United Kingdom
1. Constitutional Framework

Historically, the monarchic constitutional structure of England has
democratized, providing for checks and balances, popular representation, and a
growing awareness of the need for political and civil liberties.59 However, this
structure has left intact matters of foreign affairs and particularly of war
powers. Issues related to war have been long recognized as royal prerogatives,
solidly vested in the hands of the executive (the crown).60 This was precisely
the model that the framers of the U.S Constitution decided to reject.61 The
British arrangement contained several implicit assumptions further highlighted
through a brief comparison with the American constitutional model:
1. As long as the prerogative was not superseded by statute, the
executive had the complete power to launch a war without
consulting Parliament or any of its committees.62
2. The presumption was that the sovereign acted in the public interest,
i.e., “for the honour and interest of the nation” and not for
“inglorious or improper” reasons.63 The guarantee to ensure that the
Canal base treaty and an intolerable threat to Western economic interests.”). But note, too,
that Eden was quite ill and probably unable to manage soberly the affairs of state. See id. at
177 (“By the beginning of October Eden had reached his physical breaking point. After two
years of intense pressure from a myriad of crisis situations, the Suez problem may have put
him over the edge.”).
59 See PETER LEYLAND, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 1-4 (2012).
60 1 HERBERT BROOM, EDWARD HADLEY & SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 200 (1875) (“[T]he sovereign has . . . the sole prerogative of
making war and peace.”).
61 See YASUO HASEBE, War Powers, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 468 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012) (“[T]he Founders
clearly intended to divorce the power to initiate war from the power to prosecute it, and
hence, endorsed a limited commander in chief power.”). The power vested was to “declare
war,” not to “make war.” The framers recognized that if the country were attacked, and
therefore the war was a war of self-defense, time would be of the essence, and consultation
with the legislative branch not necessarily feasible. However, they thought that when it
comes to aggressive war, or a war of choice, the decision should be taken the legislative
branch to ensure appropriate deliberations and collective responsibility. This arrangement
was put in place despite, or maybe because of, its size (bicameral, quite slow to make
decisions). We know that this model has not worked very well, and the executive has been
quite dominant, in making the decision to go to war. The War Powers Act was meant to
structure this situation and restore the balance between Congress and the President, but the
most recent experience in Libya shows that this has not been that simple.
62 See id. at 466 (“The United Kingdom exemplifies the state in which war powers are
vested solely in the executive. That the British Parliament has no formal role in the
deployment of the armed forces makes the United Kingdom exceptional among
contemporary democracies.”).
63 BROOM ET AL., supra note 60, at 201 (“[T]he same check of parliamentary
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sovereign indeed intended to pursue the public interest resided in
the process of Parliamentary impeachment or in a parliamentary
vote of no confidence (see below).64
3. Like their American counterparts, British commentators recognized
the distinction between “making war” and “declaring war,” but their
theory justifying the distinction was different. In England, a
declaration of war served “not so much that the enemy may be put
upon his guard (which is a matter rather of magnanimity than right),
as that it may be certainly clear that the war is undertaken not by
private persons, but by the will of the whole community.”65 Again,
the premise was that the executive branch was pursuing the public
interest and was articulating the “voice of the people.”
4. Unlike the United States, where a strict separation of powers
obtained, and the president served his full term regardless of the
level of Congressional support, the British executive drew its
legitimacy from the support of Parliament. The mechanism to
control an executive decision to go to war was a parliamentary vote
of no-confidence in the cabinet. The expectation was that the
cabinet would take Parliamentary opinion into account prior to
taking a decision to go to war.
5. The British constitutional system provides that the cabinet is
collectively beholden to Parliament; in contrast, the U.S. President
embodies the executive branch, and the cabinet has no formal
constitutional power or responsibility.66
2.

The Road to War

What precipitated the British decision to attack Egypt in late 1956 and try to
reassert its prominent role in the Canal Zone? The Suez Canal was constructed
between 1858 and 1869, and following its completion was operated by the

impeachment, for improper or inglorious conduct, in beginning, conducting, or concluding a
national war, is in general sufficient to restrain the ministers of the crown from a wanton or
injurious exertion of this great prerogative.”).
64 See Jenny S. Martinez, Horizontal Structuring, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 468 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012)
(“In parliamentary systems, the prime minister typically may be removed during office by a
no-confidence vote in the legislature, while in a presidential system the president’s tenure in
office does not depend on legislative support.”).
65 BROOM ET AL., supra note 60, at 201 (emphasis added).
66 See Martinez, supra note 64, at 553 (“[I]n a presidential system, the president is
independent of the legislature, and indeed may be from a different political party than the
majority of the legislature. In a parliamentary system, on the other hand, whichever party or
coalition of parties controls the legislature also controls the executive branch.”).
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Suez Canal Company.67 In the beginning, the company’s shares were owned
by French and Egyptian investors, but later the British government (under
Disraeli’s tenure as prime minister) purchased 40% of the shares and became a
major investor.68 At the time that Nasser nationalized the Canal, two-thirds of
Europe’s oil was passing through that waterway.69 While the nationalization
was perceived as a bold defiance of the already fading colonial world order, it
was also viewed as placing in jeopardy the smooth supply of oil to Europe, oil
vital to the European economy.70
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden considered military action as soon as
he received news of Nasser’s decision to nationalize the canal.71 Eden ordered
his military command to prepare contingency plans for the restoration of the
status quo ante.72 Simultaneously, Eden established an Egypt Committee
within the cabinet to monitor the crisis and make recommendations to the
Cabinet.73 From the British constitutional perspective, Eden’s Cabinet had the
authority to decide to launch war against Egypt; the establishment of the Egypt
Committee was a step in this direction.
The jurisdiction of the Egypt Committee extended to military efforts as well
as diplomatic negotiations (spurred by the United States) to resolve the matter
through peaceful means.74 Eden used his prerogative as Prime Minister to

67

See KYLE, supra note 17, at 12 (detailing the creation of the Suez Canal).
Id. at 12-14.
69 See FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 251 n.2 (“Of the total of seventy million tons of oil
which passed from the Persian Gulf through the Suez Canal, sixty million tons were
destined for Western Europe and represented two-thirds of its oil supplies.”).
70 See LUCAS, supra note 57, at 44 (1991) (“[The Canal’s] importance as an international
waterway . . . increased with the development of the oil industry and the dependence of the
world on oil supplies.”). This context is further complicated by the Cold War, where the
West suspected the Soviet Union of supporting Nasser and attempting to gain economic
leverage against (or even to smother) Western Europe and Britain. See id. at 50 (discussing
the effect of Moscow’s weapons sales to Egypt on Western policy). Indeed, oil was the
weapon Eisenhower used to force Britain to withdraw from the canal region. See infra Part
“United States.”
71 But the UK had been contemplating military action against Egypt since the spring of
1956. LUCAS, supra note 57, at 97 (stating that in March 1956, Eden “spoke of Egypt as ‘the
main threat to [British] interests’ in Iraq and the Persian Gulf”).
72 Colin Seymour-Ure, British ‘War Cabinets’ in Limited Wars: Korea, Suez and the
Falklands, 62 PUB. ADMIN. 181, 184 (1984) (explaining that while the crisis was still
diplomatic at this point, Eden consulted the Chief of Staff).
73 Id. (“The Egypt Committee was set up by the Cabinet on the morning after Nasser
nationalized the Canal.”). The idea of a ‘war cabinet’ within the larger cabinet was modeled
after Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s WWII administration. See id. at 182 (describing
the failure of larger cabinets to “run wars” and the success of the specialists on Churchill’s
WWII War Cabinet).
74 Id. at 191-92 (stating the work of the Egypt Committee included discussing economic
sanctions and making “arrangements for a conference of maritime nations”).
68
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handpick the members of the Egypt Committee on an ad hoc basis and also to
change the membership as he saw fit.75 Thus, the Egypt Committee could not
develop a consistent or a coherent view of the crisis but was rather used as a
springboard for Prime Minister Eden’s developing policy.76 In other words, the
Egypt Committee could neither function as a bona fide check and balance on
Prime Minister Eden’s policies, nor could it ensure meaningful deliberations.
The final decision to invade Egypt and orchestrate a coup replacing Nasser
with a president more sympathetic to the colonial powers, and regain control of
the Canal, was taken by Prime Minister Eden without the benefit of too much
consultation.77 That does not mean that members of the Cabinet did not have
views and disagreements. The Minister of Defense, Walter Monckton, resigned
a few weeks before the attack because he opposed military measures.78 Others
had their doubts but decided to keep their views to themselves.79 Eden did not
seek out legal counsel in the initial stages of the process because Eden
considered the matter purely political and unencumbered by a legal
dimension.80
Eden was swayed when, in mid-October, French Prime Minister Guy Mollet
and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christian Pineau, persuaded Eden that the
military option was preferable to negotiations, and that the two European
powers should use Israel to provide a pretext for an attack.81 Eden did not feel

75

Id. at 184 (suggesting that characterizing the Egypt Committee as a single, well
defined entity is misleading).
76 Id. at 185 (describing the fluctuating membership of the Egypt Committee as has
having political significance because its fluctuating membership strengthened Prime
Minister Eden’s “personal position”).
77 See id. at 184-85. Eden was one of the brave politicians who opposed the Munich
agreement between Prime Minister Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler. See LUCAS, supra note
57, at 23 (explaining that Eden resigned as Foreign Secretary in 1938 and aligned himself
with opponents of appeasement). As Eden faced Nasser’s violation of Egypt’s agreement
with Britain, he thought of Nasser as the new Mussolini, if not the new Hitler. Id. This
assumption fed his determination to resist Nasser’s nationalization. This view could be
interpreted as tunnel vision, an act of “fighting the last war.” Id.
78 Id. at 254 (explaining that Monckton resigned because he “believed the use of force
against Egypt would be a ‘great blunder’”).
79
See id. at 249 (“A dissenter could have resigned, at the cost of his career.”).
80 Evidently, Eden did not doubt his constitutional power to launch the war. What Eden
was trying to avoid was the effect of international law on the question of the legality of the
war. For example, Eden objected to the briefing of the Foreign Office Legal Adviser, Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice, saying: “That’s the last person I want consulted. The lawyers are
always against our doing anything. For God’s sake, keep them out of it. This is a political
affair.” Id. at 238. For a different view, see D.R. THORPE, EDEN: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
ANTHONY EDEN, FIRST EARL OF AVON, 1897-1977 (2004).
81 LUCAS, supra note 57, at 239 (stating that the British Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Lloyd, made a “final attempt to save negotiations with Egypt,” but the French found this
“quite unsatisfactory”).
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he needed the approval of his cabinet. He called his Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd, to return from New York (where he was attending the
United Nations sessions and negotiating a deal with the Egyptians) and sent
him to France to finalize war plans.82
Present at the top-secret meeting were French Prime Minister Guy Mollet
and his Ministers of Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Israel’s Prime
Minister David Ben Gurion (who also served as Minister of Defense), his
Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan, and Shimon Peres, Director General of the
Ministry of Defense. 83 A contract (“Sèvre Protocol”) was hurriedly negotiated,
typed (by the only woman present, a secretary) and signed by Britain, France,
and Israel.84 In the Sèvre Protocol, Israel’s Prime Minister Ben-Gurion
committed Israel to engage in “acts of war” against Egypt, thereby providing
the British and French governments a pretext to issue an ultimatum to both
Israel and Egypt (thus maintaining the appearance of even-handedness) and
shortly thereafter launch their war on Egypt.85 The ultimatum amounted to a
decision to launch a war because it was clear that war would follow; because
Egypt was not expected to obey the ultimatum.86 The record shows that a few
key ministers deliberated the proposal to go to war, but that Prime Minister
Eden dominated the process and his will prevailed.87
On October 25, the British envoys returned from Paris and Prime Minister
Eden assembled his cabinet.88 Eden presented the plan of attack, disclosing that
an Israeli attack was expected, but did not reveal the full content of the Sèvre
Protocol.89 The inner circle of cabinet ministers voted in favor of the plan and
82

Id. at 239 (discussing Lloyd’s return from New York and the subsequent trip to Paris
to negotiate with the French).
83 See Seymour-Ure; supra note 72, at 192 (describing the membership of meetings that
led to “Anglo-French-Israeli collusion”).
84 See LUCAS, supra note 57, at 247 (describing the contents of the Sèvre Protocol and
stating that the document “called for the endorsement of ‘the three governments’”). See also
Avi Shlain, The Protocol of Sevres, 1956: Anatomy of a War Plot, 73 INT’L AFF. 509
(1997).
85 See id. (“The British and French agreed that if Israel attacked Egypt, they would
intervene ‘to protect the Canal.’”); IZHAK BAR-ON, “AN UMBRELLA IN A RAINY DAY . . .”
FRENCH-ISRAELI SECURITY RELATIONS, 1948-1956 at 548-51 (2010) (reproducing the Sèvre
Protocol).
86 See LUCAS, supra note 57, at 247 (describing the Egyptian refusal as “inevitable”).
87 See Seymour-Ure, supra note 72, at 191-93 (describing the Egypt Committee as a
“partial Cabinet” led by Eden that often times made decisions without prior discussion with
the full cabinet).
88 Id. at 192 (“The Cabinet agreed with the recommendation to intervene with the French
in the event of an Israeli attack.”).
89 See LUCAS, supra note 57, at 249 (suggesting that Eden refrained from mentioning the
Sèvre Protocol in order to “minimise the possibility of division within the Cabinet”). But see
THORPE, supra note 80 (writing that Eden did disclose the fact of the Protocol to his
cabinet).
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the rest followed suit.90 At this stage, legal advice concerning the perspective
of international law was sought, but Eden avoided his own Attorney General
and instead commissioned a memorandum from the head of the Judiciary,
whom he knew would support his position.91 The process was honored but
substance was lacking.
On October 30, 1956, following the Israeli invasion of the Sinai, Prime
Minister Eden led his cabinet to invoke the royal prerogative and issue an
ultimatum/appeal to Egypt and Israel in behalf of Her Majesty, the Queen.92
The ultimatum presented the British attack as a means to restore the peace
rather than as an aggressive act meant to achieve regime change. The story
both Eden and Mollet hoped the world would buy was that the Israeli
“surprise” conquest of the Sinai threatened the operations of the Suez Canal
and therefore necessitated British and French intervention to restore peace.93
What was planned behind closed doors as a preventive war, a war of choice,
was to be presented to the public as a peace-loving intervention. The British
cabinet viewed Eden’s announcement as a fait accompli and approved the
measure.94
At four-thirty in the afternoon, accompanied by Secretary of the Foreign
Office Selwyn Lloyd, Prime Minister Anthony Eden entered the House of
Commons and announced the issuance of the British-French ultimatum.95 The
90 LUCAS, supra note 57, at 249 (“Given the agreement between senior ministers to
proceed, Monckton [the former Minister of Defense] and other junior Ministers could not
upset Eden’s strategy. A dissenter could have resigned, at the cost of his career, but, as of 25
October, he had no cause to present to the Commons or to the public.”).
91 In 2006, declassified British documents revealed further manipulation of the
constitutional process by Prime Minister Eden in order to secure the approval of his cabinet.
Instead of requesting the advice of Attorney General, Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller, as
was the norm in matters related to foreign affairs, Eden requested Lord Kilmuir, the Lord
Chancellor (or head of the judiciary), to craft a memorandum justifying the war under
international law. Geoffrey Marston, Armed Intervention in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis: The
Legal Advice Tendered to the British Government, 37 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 773, 777 (1988)
(stating that Lord Kilmuir believed the United Kingdom was legally entitled to use military
force against Egypt as a form of self-defense).
92 The ultimatum to Israel was a part of the collusion between the three countries. See
supra text note 85. Israel expected the ultimatum and, in any event, was in no need of being
warned, as Israel had been encouraged to invade Egypt by the U.K. and France.
93 See 558 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1956) 1275 (U.K.) (“[A]ny fighting on the banks
of the Canal would endanger the ships actually on passage.”); LUCAS, supra note 57, at 249
(describing intervention as a means to “prevent interference with the free flow of traffic
through the Canal”).
94 Seymour-Ure, supra note 72, at 192 (discussing the full cabinet’s approval of the war
measure). At the meeting of the full cabinet authorizing the war ultimatum leading to the
British invasion, Eden is supposed to have said, “A lot of my present colleagues never
served in a War Cabinet,” to which one of the ministers retorted, “We didn’t know we were
at war.” Id. at 185.
95 558 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1956) 1275 (U.K.) (“Her Majesty’s Government and

1314

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1297

Sèvre Protocol was not mentioned.96 A lively debate ensued, led by members
of the opposition Labour Party who vigorously criticized the fact that
Parliament was not consulted.97 Still, the House of Commons supported Eden
by fifty-two votes.98
From the perspective of constitutional design, the striking fact is that there
was no constitutional process of checks and balances and no mechanism in
place to assess the pros and cons of Eden’s decision to go to war. It is one
thing to vest the decision to go to war in the executive branch. It is quite
another to avoid the administrative mechanisms within the executive branch
designed to provide assessment and quality control. Additionally, Eden made
sure that the civil service at the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defense, and
the Treasury Department were not informed of the impending actions.99 Also,
Eden’s Egypt Committee was not encouraged to voice dissent. Not subjected
to challenging input, Eden also persuaded himself that the United States, while
unhappy, would go along with Britain’s actions.100 After all, the United
Kingdom was a loyal ally, the Cold War was raging, and Washington was well
aware of Nasser’s flirtation with the Soviets and considered Nasser a menace
to world order. Significantly, Eden also assumed that the structure of the
United Nations would play into his hands. The United Kingdom had a veto
power at the UN Security Council and a British veto, he calculated, would
prevent an escalation of the conflict. As we shall see, Washington’s reaction
surprised Eden and dramatically upset his expectations. Had Eden allowed his
cabinet and upper echelons of the civil service to brainstorm the war plans
freely, he may well have anticipated some of the developments that eventually
brought about his demise.
3.

Aftermath: Modifying the Constitutional Framework of War Powers

In the 21st Century the United Kingdom began rethinking the royal
prerogative in the context of proper governance. In 2011, the Cabinet Manual
“pointed out that the Coalition government had in 2011 ‘acknowledged that a

the French Government have accordingly agreed that everything possible should be done to
bring hostilities to an end as soon as possible.”).
96 Eden continually denied any “collusion” between the UK, France and Israel. See
LUCAS, supra note 57, at 248 (explaining that Eden “instructed Dean and Logan to return to
Paris to destroy all copies of the agreement”).
97 558 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1956) 1283 (U.K.) (expressing concern that members
of the House “may be denied the opportunity” to express their views on the issue).
98 The vote was 270:218 (listing “ayes” and “noes”). See 558 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
(1956) 1377-82 (U.K).
99 See LUCAS, supra note 57, at 249 (stating that Eden “limited the details of Sèvres to an
inner circle of Ministers”).
100 TURNER, supra note 17 at 264-65 (suggesting that Eden “underestimated the influence
of Eisenhower” on United States’ foreign policy).
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convention had developed in Parliament that before troops were committed the
House of Commons should have an opportunity to debate the matter . . . .’”101
In 2003 Prime Minister Tony Blair requested Parliamentary approval for
ensuring “the disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.”102
Thereafter, Parliament deliberated the need to restructure the royal prerogative,

101 MARK RYAN & STEVE FOSTER, UNLOCKING CONSTITUTIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
280 (Rourtledge ed., 3d ed. 2014) (discussing the use of the United Kingdom’s military
abroad). Clare Short, MP, submitted a private member bill in 2005 that led to the
crystallization of the convention. See id. at 280 (explaining the rationale behind the bill as
the need to ensure decisions to use the military were “effectively scrutinized”); THE
GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN: WAR POWERS AND TREATIES: LIMITING EXECTUTIVE POWERS, 2007,
CP26/07, at 24-58 (U.K.) (discussing the issues involved in deploying armed forces abroad).
The Report explores the question of whether “new arrangements should be contained in a
freestanding convention, or in a resolution of the House, or in legislation?” Id. at 3. The
report also contains a brief survey of the constitutional arrangements from a comparative
perspective. Id. at 66-68 (detailing parliamentary involvement in decisions to deploy troops
in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United
States). See also MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN – CONSTITUTIONAL
RENEWAL, 2008, Cm. 7342-I (U.K.); HASEBE, supra note 61 at 466-68 (comparing the
process of mobilizing troops in the United Kingdom with the process in the United States).
In the late 20th century the British government continued to deploy the prerogative but the
Suez experience made it more sensitive to the political and legal ramifications of its
decisions. See 2 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE FALKLANDS
CAMPAIGN 21-9 (2005) (recounting the various stages of the British war in the Falklands in
1982, in which much attention was invested in governance procedures and legal advice).
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher did not seek the explicit authorization of Parliament for
the armed conflict in the Falklands and yet she did enjoy Parliamentary support since the
early days of the crisis. See id. at 19 (“With the Labour leadership’s support, and from the
centre parties as well, there was no serious organized opposition in Parliament to sending
the Task Force.”). In accordance with previous custom, Thatcher established a war cabinet.
Id. at 21 (describing the War Cabinet as “the critical instrument of crisis management”). The
Foreign Office’s legal counsel advised the Government that British action would amount to
a war of self-defense. Id. at 90 (explaining the legality behind the British decision to declare
war). Furthermore, the United Kingdom secured support from the United Nations Security
Council. Id. at 43 (“The Security Council . . . Determining that there exists a breach of the
peace in the region of the Falkland Islands . . . Demands an immediate withdrawal of All
Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands.”). Additionally, there was close consultation
with the United States as well as with other Western powers. Id. at 157 (describing the
United States’ role in helping to find a “peaceful solution”). As expected, “Suez . . . [was]
the constant reference point on how not to manage great crises.” Id. at 26. “[The] Suez
Debacle [was] a powerful memory for all those contemplating the way in which such
ventures [could] go horribly wrong.” Id. at 93. Additionally, the British Government did not
seek Parliamentary authorization for the military intervention in Yugoslavia (1999) nor in
Afghanistan. HASEBE, supra at 467 (stating that it has not been general practice to ask for
parliamentary permission to deploy military forces).
102 401 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) (2003) 760 (U.K.) (stating that “it is right that the
House debate this issue and pass judgment”).
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recognizing that it was an antiquated constitutional arrangement in need of
democratic reform.103 A 2004 House of Commons report recommended
legislation that would require Parliamentary authorization prior to the
deployment of forces.104 A 2006 House of Lords report recommended a softer
version. The House of Lords report proposed a parliamentary convention,
formalized by a House of Commons resolution, but not legislation.105
In 2007, Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s Government issued a Green Paper
titled “The Governance of Britain,” endorsing the House of Lords’
recommendations and conceding that the royal prerogative was outdated.106
Brown lost power 2010. So far, Prime Minister David Cameron’s Government
has not pushed forward any legislation, but has followed the practice of
consulting Parliament introduced by Tony Blair in 2003, thereby conceding the
emergence of a constitutional convention.107 In August 2013, Prime Minister
Cameron brought a motion to Parliament asking for the endorsement of the
introduction of United Kingdom’s forces into hostilities in Syria. The motion
failed 285-272 and Cameron proceeded to assure Parliament that he would not
use military action in Syria under the royal prerogative before another vote in
the Commons.108 It has been suggested that a convention modifying the
103

401 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) (2003) 760 (U.K.) (characterizing parliamentary
debate as “the democracy that is our right”).
104 PUB. ADMIN. SELECT COMM., TAMING THE PREROGATIVE: STRENGTHENING
MINISTERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY TO PARLIAMENT, 2003-4, H.C. 422, at 31-33 (U.K.)
(suggesting a draft bill that would “require Parliament’s approval to be obtained for the
exercise of certain [executive powers]”).
105 SELECT COMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, WAGING WAR: PARLIAMENT’S ROLE AND
RESPONSIBILITY, 2005-6, H.L 263-I, at 26-38 (U.K.) (describing possible methods for
increase Parliament’s involvement in the decision to deploy forces). The Committee’s very
thoughtful report recommended that parliamentary approval be sought prior to engagement
in military conflicts, specifying that the Government should provide to Parliament “the
deployment’s objectives, its legal basis, likely duration and, in general terms, an estimation
of its size.” Id. at 43.
106 THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN, 2007, at 19 (U.K.) (“The Government will propose
that the House of Commons develop a parliamentary convention that could be formalised by
a resolution. In parallel, it will give further consideration to the option of legislation.”). The
March 2008 report, “The Governance of Britain - Constitutional Renewal,” includes the
Government’s recommendations, and presents a Draft Detailed War Powers Resolution.
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN – CONSTITUTIONAL RENEWAL, 2008,
Cm. 7342-I, at 50 (U.K.) (“While not ruling out legislation in the future, the Government
believes that a detailed resolution is the best way forward.”).
107 In 2011, Cameron’s Foreign Secretary committed to “enshrine in law for the future
the necessity of consulting Parliament on military action.” POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM COMMITTEE PARLIAMENT’S ROLE IN CONFLICT DECISIONS: AN UPDATE, 2013, H.C.,
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmpolcon/649/64903.htm.
108 Syria crisis: Cameron loses Commons vote on Syria action, BBC NEWS (Aug. 30,
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-23892783 (detailing Parliament’s rejection of
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prerogative has been solidified and that future United Kingdom Governments
are likely to seek Parliament’s consent prior to any military action.109
C.

France
1.

Constitutional Framework

France emerged from the Second World War demoralized, even angry. The
grim and hasty defeat of its military forces as well as the experience of the
Vichy regime bore hard on its people. The Fourth Republic, inaugurated after
the liberation, was unstable and ungrounded.110 The Fourth Republic’s
constitution placed the locus of political power in the National Assembly and
expected the representatives of the people to closely monitor executive
actions.111 The cabinet (“Conseil de Ministres”) was headed by a prime
minister (“President de Conseuil”) approved by and accountable to the
National Assembly.112 Through the 1950s, the French were not only trying to
recover from the trauma of World War II, but were also confronting the
intractable political questions of the current moment: What should be done
about Inodochina, hitherto a French colony? How should the French think
about Algeria? Was Algeria indeed “French soil,” or did it belong to the
Algerian people?113 These questions, in addition to contentious social and

a motion to introduce military forces into Syria and Cameron’s “ruling out” of “joining USled strikes”); RYAN & FOSTER, supra note 101, at 280 (explaining Prime Minister
Cameron’s promise not to deploy military forces in Syria before another vote).
109 Further reports by the House of Commons’ Political and Constitutional Reform
Committee (“PCRC”) and the House of Lords’ Constitution Committee repeated the
recommendations of the 2004 and 2006 reports by the same institutions. See Catherine
Haddon, Parliament, the Royal Prerogative and decisions to go to war, INSTITUTE FOR
GOVERNMENT
(Sept.
6,
2013),
http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/6589/parliament-the-royal-prerogative-anddecisions-to-go-to-war/ (“A strong political convention has therefore been set. It will be
politically very difficult for governments . . . to take significant military action without clear
(and potentially prior) approval from Parliament.”).
110 See generally GEORGETTE ELGEY, HISTORE DE LA IVE RÉPUBLIQUE (1954-1959)
(1992).
111
MAURICE DUVERGER, CONSTITUTIONS ET DOCUMENTS POLITIQUES 286 (1982)
(reproducing the Fourth Republic’s constitution); 1946 CONST. 7 (Fr.), available at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/lesconstitutions-de-la-france/constitution-de-1946-ive-republique.5109.html (stating that the
executive could not declare war without a vote of the National Assembly).
112 1946 CONST. 45-48 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/les-constitutions-de-la-france/constitution-de-1946ive-republique.5109.html (describing the relationship between the Council of Ministers, the
Prime Minister, and the National Assembly).
113 See generally ELGEY, supra note 110 (cataloging the history and issues of the Fourth
Republic).
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political issues, led to severe instability. One government after another fell as a
result of the National Assembly’s dissatisfaction and votes of no confidence.114
In the twelve years from 1946, when the Fourth Republic was inaugurated,
to 1958, when the Fourth Republic collapsed, France had twenty governments.
Socialist Prime Minister Guy Mollet was the 17th Prime Minister in ten years,
and came to power on January 1, 1956, six months before the nationalization
of the Canal.115 In June 1957, shortly after the Suez debacle, Maurice BourgesMaunoury, the hawkish Minister of Defense, replaced Mollet. 116 BourgesMaunoury, a central figure in hatching the plans for the Suez War, lasted five
months as prime minister.117 Mollet and Bourges-Maunoury were both rather
inexperienced in matters of foreign affairs and in navigating the ship of state in
their respective roles as they propelled France to war.
France had two more prime ministers before Charles de Gaulle took office.
In 1958, the Fourth Republic gave way to the Fifth Republic. De Gaulle
insisted that France adopt a new constitution bearing similarity to the United
States’ model of an independent and all-powerful president.118
2.

The Road to War

Article Seven of the Fourth Republic’s Constitution placed the power to go
to war in the National Assembly, contingent upon the recommendation of the
executive branch (the cabinet).119 It was thus somewhat similar to the United
States’ requirement that Congress declare war, but different in that the Fourth
Republic’s constitution did implicitly recognize the role of the executive in the
matter. Article 7 stated: “La guerre ne peut être déclarée sans un vote de
l’Assemblée Nationale et l’avis préalable du Conseil de la République”120 (in
English, “[W]ar can not be declared without a vote of the National Assembly
and the notice of the Council of the Republic”).121 “Without the vote” implied

114

See generally id.
See id.
116 See id. During Bourges-Maunoury’s short term, France signed the Treaty of Rome,
paving the way to the European Community. See generally LEPRINCE, supra note 38, at 107
(2004).
117 See ELGEY, supra note 110.
118 1958 CONST. 5 (Fr.) (outlining the power of the president).
119 See supra note 111 (describing Article 7 and the distribution of power between the
executive and the National Assembly).
120 Constitution de la IVe République, DIGITHÈQUE MJP (1999), http://mjp.univperp.fr/france/co1946-0.htm#2. By contrast, the Constitution of the Third French Republic
placed the power to declare war in the Executive Branch subject to parliamentary approval.
1874 CONST. 9 (Fr.) (“The President of the Republic cannot declare war except by the
previous assent of the two chambers.”).
121 1946 CONST. 7 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/les-constitutions-de-la-france/constitution-de-1946ive-republique.5109.html.
115
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that the initiative would come from the executive who would bring the
measure to parliamentary approval.
When Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal, some high
officers of the French military command, as well as a few cabinet ministers,
were already at work planning his overthrow.122 Nasser, who recently acquired
vast quantities of arms from the Soviet Union, was turning his old arms over to
the Algerian rebels.123 Nasser was also providing military training and other
support to the Algerian rebellion and embraced the Algerian cause as a part of
the grand vision of pan-Arab liberation.124 Nasser’s rhetoric was intoxicating to
Arabs as well as to the group of non-aligned developing nations. It was quite
alarming to Western ears, especially to the French and the British, who
experienced Nasser’s words as a call to shatter the world order as the French
and British had known it.125
While consulting with officials of the British government about the various
options of dealing with the crisis, the French were separately exploring
collaboration with Israel.126
A short diversion to explain the growing closeness with Israel is in order.
On May 25, 1950, the United States, Britain, and France imposed an embargo
on arms sales to the Middle East in an effort to prevent another conflagration
of war in the area.127 Following the 1955 Egypt-Soviet arms pact, as Israel felt
122 See ELGEY, supra note 110. The French were not alone. Britain and the United States
were also planning either a coup or an assassination, finding Nasser irritable and
untrustworthy. See LUCAS, supra note 57, at 111 (describing Operation OMEGA, developed
in March 1956, which was “the cornerstone of Anglo-American co-operation against
Nasser”).
123 See id. at 122 (stating that Nasser “refused to halt arms supplies” to the Algerian
rebels).
124 See id. at 121 (discussing Nasser’s support for the Algerian rebels); TURNER, supra
note 17, at 228 (describing Nasser as “the self-proclaimed champion of Arab nationalism”).
125 See LUCAS, supra note 57, at 149 (“The whole Western position in the Middle East
would be jeopardized if Nasser gets away with this action.”).
126 FREIBERGER, supra note 7 at 180-81 (1992) (“Paris began seriously to consider joining
Israel in a military venture against Egypt.”). The French did not initially report their
negotiations with the Israelis because Britain had close ties with the Arab world, and a
defense treaty with Iraq and Jordan. Id. at 182 (suggesting that Israel also had concerns
about British involvement because of the British Anglo-Jordanian defense treaty); Laurie
Milner,
The
Suez
Canal:
History,
BBC
(Mar.
3,
2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/suez_01.shtml (“In an attempt to strengthen
security in the Middle East against Soviet influence, Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan
signed a treaty known as the Baghdad Pact in 1955.”). Israel had been left out of this Pact.
At that time Britain had no interest in collaborating with the Israelis. M. BAR-ON, OF ALL
THE KINGDOMS, ISRAEL’S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM DURING THE FIRST DECADE
AFTER THE END OF THE BRITISH MANDATE IN PALESTINE 1948-1958, 164 (2006).
127 FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 20-21 (“[The agreement] called for ‘formal assurances’
from Middle East nations receiving Western military equipment that it would not be used
against other states in the area. On May 25 the U.S., U.K., and France issued the Tripartite
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increasingly threatened and was frantically looking for weapons to defend
itself in the event of a second round of war, France decided to abandon the
embargo, and agreed to sell arms to Israel.128
A part of the budding French friendship towards Israel was rooted in the
sympathy that members of the French government felt for the Jewish people.129
French politicians and military officers who had been active in the Resistance
were very familiar with the horrors of the Holocaust and felt a special
responsibility towards the Jewish state.130 Others identified with Israel’s
socialist ideology.131 But no one should underestimate the mighty role of real
politik. The French identified Israel as a useful instrument in implementing
their plans for a new/old order in the Middle East.132 The more exasperated the
French became with Nasser, and the more frustrated they were with current
events in Algeria, the cozier their relations with Israel were becoming.133
Secrecy and compartmentalization kept the rapidly developing friendship
between the two nations in a cocoon.134 France’s military and diplomatic
relations with Israel were largely held behind closed doors. Talks between
Israel and France were confined to the Ministry of Defense, where Minister
Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, a former leader of the resistance, as well as the
leading generals under his command were particularly friendly towards
Israel.135 Socialist Prime Minister Guy Mollet also supported the intensifying
relationship, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christian Pineau (who was kept

Declaration to that effect.”).
128 FULLICK, ROY & POWELL, GEOFFERY, SUEZ: THE DOUBLE WAR 6 (1979) (“Israel . . .
needed arms, and France supplied them.”) France was motivated, among other things, by the
need for money. All arms to Israel at that time were sold for cash and at market value.
GOLANI supra note 27, at 26-27 (French sale of arms to Israel was “subject to . . . payment
in cash, of course”).
129 FULLICK, supra note 128, at 6 (“[France] had discovered that she had much in
common with Israel. The people of both countries had similar memories of Hitler’s
persecutions.”).
130 Id. at 6 (discussing the connection and sympathy French felt to Israel regarding their
suffering at the hands of Hitler).
131 Id. at 6-7 (“Guy Mollet, the post-war premier of . . . France, was a socialist in
sympathy with Israeli socialism.”).
132 GOLANI, supra note 27, at 26 (“As France’s troubles in Algeria were becoming more
aggravated by the day, Israel managed to persuade the French that it could be quite useful to
them.”).
133 Id. at 45 (“France’s already close relations with Israel grew even closer as the crisis
progressed.”).
134 Milner, supra note 126 (in months before the attack, “[t]he French government had
been meeting secretly with Israel”).
135 GOLANI, supra note 27 at 45 (“[Quite a few French leaders at the time (such as
Mollet, Bourgès-Maunory and Abel Thomas, the director-General of the Ministry of
Defense) had not long before been the Resistance leaders, and therefore were sympathetic
now to the Jewish state.]”).
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as a Minister of Foreign Affairs in the subsequent Bourges-Maunoury
government) joined Mollet in approving a scenario under which Israel would
trigger an international military crisis that would precipitate Nasser’s
demise.136 Like Anthony Eden, his British counterpart, Mollet insisted that
Pineau refrain from sharing the information with the Quai D’Orsay (France’s
foreign ministry), and so it was.137 French foreign officers were perceived to be
either pro-Arab, uncomfortable with the interaction between Israel and France,
or unhappy about the unusual plans for a preventive war and its cover-up.138 It
was therefore decided that it would be better to keep them uninformed of any
developments. Once the matter had ripened into a solid plan, it went out of the
hands of the military command and into the domain of the civil government; an
inner cabinet (gouvernment interne) was established headed by Prime Minister
Mollet) and four other ministers.139
All through September and the first half of October 1956, the French were
following two tracks simultaneously. They were discussing with the British
government the prospects of military action against Egypt140 and they were
separately exploring military collaboration against Egypt with Israel.141 It
appears that initially the British were adamantly opposed to Israeli
involvement.142 It also appears that the Israeli government itself (as distinct
from its zealous military command) was not too warm to the French plan.143 In
September 1956, a secret delegation led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Golda
Meir (one of the few women in this story) visited Paris to discuss military
options.144 She returned with the report that “the discussions ended with no
concrete results.”145 However, General Maurice Challe, who conceived the
military plan, continued to work out the details of the military attack with
Israel’s military command as well as with Shimon Peres, the Director General
136 GOLANI supra note 27, at 110 (“Mollet and Pineau . . . agreed on the ‘Israeli pretext’
idea.”).
137 SKARDON, C. PHILIP, A LESSON FOR OUR TIMES: HOW AMERICA KEPT THE PEACE IN
THE HUNGARY-SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956, at 89 (2010) (“The Suez intervention was . . . a foreign
policy-operation conducted outside of the Quai d’Orsay.”).
138 DAVID TAL, THE 1956 WAR: COLLUSION AND RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 53 (2013)
("[T]he hostility of the Quai d'Orsay . . . dictated a highly covert series of meetings and
conversations.").
139 See M. BAR ZOHAR, SUEZ ULTRA-SECRET 146 (1964).
140 FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 177 (referencing the continuation of “Anglo-French
military planning”).
141 Id. at 181 (detailing discussions between France and Israel of a joint attack).
142 FULLICK, supra note 128, at 82-83 (stating that at first, it seemed “impossible to
reconcile differences” between Israeli and British approaches to Suez).
143 GOLANI, supra note 27, at 77 stating that Ben-Gurion’s instructions to a delegation
headed to France indicated “his apprehensions about an Israeli-initiated war.”
144 Id. at 77-78 (detailing the SIDON delegation’s travels to Paris to discuss the
possibility of a joint military operation).
145 Id. at 79. Meir was thereafter excluded from the war plans.
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of the Ministry of Defense. Finally, on October 14, the French arrived in
London to offer Eden collaboration with France and the Israelis.146 They relied
on encouragement they received from Israeli military officers and civilian
appointees, not elected officials. The essence of the plan was that Israel would
commit an act of aggression (tantamount to ‘real war’ as distinct from a limited
armed conflict) thereby providing the UK and France with the necessary cover
to intervene militarily without appearing to be aggressors and violators of
international law.147
In London, Prime Minister Eden, aware that time was running out on the
feasibility of military attack, quelled his reservations and accepted a
collaboration with Israel.148 He recalled his Minister of Foreign affairs, Selwyn
Lloyd, from New York and sent him to Paris to finalize the war plans.149
The meeting in Sèvres between the French, the British, and the Israelis
ended with the signing of the deal known as the Sèvre Protocol, or the
“collusion.”150 Everyone present understood that the agreement was to be kept
in total secrecy.151
In his memoires, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Christian Pineau
recalled that in the middle of the Sèvre discussions he left to inform President
Rene Coty of the developments. Coty, who disapproved of these plans, is
reported to have responded: “If the Israelis are willing to play a part in this
comedy it is not up to us to dissuade them.”152
The next day, Prime Minister Anthony Eden dispatched a letter to Prime
Minister Guy Mollet. The letter did not mention the protocol, but stated that
“Her Majesty’s Government has been informed of the course of the
conversation held at Sèvres . . . They confirm that in the situation there
envisaged they will take the action described.”153 The letter was addressed only
146

FULLICK, supra note 128, at 77 (1979) (detailing the planning meeting between
France and Britain).
147 Id. at 77-78 (“Challe outlined the French proposals. They were that Israel should be
persuaded to attack Egypt across the Sinai and that Britain and France . . . should then invite
both sides to withdraw . . . so that an Anglo-French force could land to protect the waterway
. . . Then, on excuse of separating the combatants, the allies would take control of both
Canal and installations.”).
148 Id. at 78 (“At last Eden had been shown a way in which the war could be started. It
was the excuse for which he had been long searching.”).
149 Id. (stating that Eden telephoned Lloyd “[w]ithin minutes of the two Frenchmen’s
departure”).
150 Id. at 78 (“[On] 24 October, the secret protocol of Sèvres was ready for signature.”).
151 KYLE, supra note 17, at 330 (stating that the protocol “pledged total secrecy”). For a
long time it has been believed that the only copy left was that kept by Ben-Gurion because
the British destroyed theirs and the French insisted that they had lost it. However, Anthony
Eden’s biographer reproduced a copy in his book, stating that it was found in the French
archives. See THORPE, supra note 80. See also supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
152 PINEAU, supra note 15, at 141.
153 Letter from Guy Mollet, French Prime Minister, to Anthony Eden, British Prime
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to Mollet, and did not mention Ben-Gurion, in keeping with Eden’s
determination to avoid any mention of collaboration with Israel.154 Mollet then
composed a letter to Ben-Gurion ratifying the agreement to go to war with
Eden’s letter attached to it.155
Following Israel’s invasion of Egypt, Mollet called his cabinet to an
emergency meeting to approve the appeal/ultimatum to Israel and Egypt. The
ministers, who were not members of the inner cabinet, were not privy to the
plans and were not expecting a war against Egypt, but they agreed to give it a
chance.156 After some deliberation, the measure received unanimous
approval.157 Mollet and Pineau then flew to London to meet with Eden, who
had by then secured his own cabinet’s endorsement of the ultimatum.158 The
two prime ministers had concerns about the timing of the ultimatum because of
Eisenhower’s opposition, but overcame their hesitation.159 British General
Keightly was ordered to occupy the Canal Zone as soon as Egypt rejected the
ultimatum.160
Returning to Paris in the evening, Mollet headed to the National Assembly.
He presented the French and British ultimatum issued to Israel and Egypt
earlier that afternoon and asked for “a massive vote of support, one that will
send the message of the resolve and peaceful intentions of the French
people.”161 Indeed, he got just the support he was hoping for. Unlike the

Minister (Oct. 25, 1956), reprinted in Troen, S. Ilan, The Protocol of Sevres:
British/French/Israeli Collusion Against Egypt, 1965, 1:2 ISRAELI STUDIES 122 ,137 (1996),
available at http://www.brandeis.edu/israelcenter/about/troen1/TheProtocolOfSevres.pdf.
154 Id. (full text of the letter).
155 Letter from Guy Mollet, French Prime Minister, to Ben-Gurion, Israeli Prime
Minister (Oct. 25, 1956), reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL
821-22 (Baruch Gilead, 2008) (“Mon cher Premier Ministre: Je vous confirme l’accord du
gouvernement Français sur le résultat des conversations de Sévres et les termes du protocol
final auquel ells ont donné lieu.”). See also GOLANI, supra note 27, at 374 (1997). Eden sent
emissaries to get French and Israeli copies of the agreement destroyed, but “by then BenGurion’s copy was hidden deep in his breast pocket.” BAR-ON, supra note 37, at 243.
156 Bar-Zohar, supra note 139, at 174.
157 Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: OFFICE OF
THE
HISTORIAN
n.2,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus195557v16/d422#fnref1 (last visited Mar. 19, 2015) (“French Cabinet that morning had
unanimously approved French military intervention in the Suez Canal Zone.”).
158 Id. (“The Embassy . . . noted that Pineau had left for London at 9:30 a.m. . . and
Mollet at 11:30 a.m.”).
159 FULLICK, supra note 128, at 92 (“Eden had taken the precaution of delaying his cable
to Eisenhower telling him about the ultimatum . . . [thus]avoiding the danger of the
President bringing last minute pressure on him to withhold it.”).
160 The French had already prepared bills designed to replace the Egyptian money in the
occupied Zone. Other plans for the occupation were also completed.
161 Council of the Republic, Parliamentary Debates, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], October 30, 1956, p. 2109-
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British public, the French were eager to see an energetic government ready to
do what it took to quell the rebellion in Algeria.162 Many saw Nasser as
directly responsible for the trouble in Algeria and therefor approved of action
against Egypt.163 The French National Assembly voted in favor by a margin of
368 and 182 against.164 In France’s upper chamber, the Sénat, Mollet’s
Minister of Justice François Mitterrand (to be France’s President decades later)
presented the motion. Mitterand was not privy to the war plans, but went along
with the plan.165 The Senate vote was even more enthusiastic: 289 were in
favor and only 19 opposed.166 It is clear that the constitutional check on a
trigger-happy executive was missing. The French Prime Minister did not feel
that Article Seven of the French Constitution, which requires a declaration of
war prior to issuing the ultimatum, should be literally followed. Rather, he
probably believed that a formal endorsement after the ultimatum was issued
and French Forces already engaged would suffice. The Prime Minister was
likely confident that the Assembly would give him retroactive support.
Needless to say, the Sèvres Protocol was not mentioned. In the protocol France
had specifically agreed to provide the Israel air support until the Egyptian air
force was destroyed.167 This provision, written in an appendix to the Protocol,
was kept secret from the British, and withheld from the French Parliament as
well.168 It is however doubtful that knowledge of the Appendix would have
affected the majority of French Parliamentarians. For them, the legal niceties
could not be held as barriers to what they considered a necessary and
imperative action.

38. See also BARALE, JEAN, LA CONSTITUTION DE LA IVE RÉPUBLIQUE À L'ÉPREUVE DE LA
GUERRE 184-85 (1964). According to Barale, members of the assembly regretted the quick
approval they gave the prime minister, once they realized the dimensions of the debacle. Id.
at 186.
162 KHOURI, FRED JOHN, THE ARAB-ISRAELI DILEMMA 211 (3d ed. 1985) (asserting that
since the French blamed Egypt for the uprising in Algeria, "public opinion gave very strong
support for the use of armed power in order to save French pride.").
163 Id. (“France blamed Egypt's material and moral support for the persistence of the
Algerian rebellion.”).
164 ELGEY, supra note 110.
165 SALLY BAUMANN-REYNOLDS, FRANCOIS MITTERRAND: THE MAKING OF A SOCIALIST
PRINCE IN REPUBLICAN FRANCE 53 (1995).
166 National Assembly, Parliamentary Debates, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], October 30, 1956, p. 4421-26.
167 KYLE, supra note 17, at 566 (“The French Government undertakes to . . . ensure the
air defense of Israeli territory.”).
168 Id. at 566 (suggesting that France and Israel, “did not mention [the appendix] to the
British representatives”). DAVID CARLTON, Great Britain, France and the Suez Crisis, in LA
FRANCE ET L’OPERATION DE SUEZ DE 1956, at 63-64 (Ministre de la Defense, centre
d’etudes d’historie de la defense).
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Aftermath: Modifying the Constitutional Framework of War Powers

In 1958, Charles de Gaul came to power.169 He insisted that a new form of
government be established for France.170 The new French Constitution
inaugurated the Fifth French Republic in place today. At first, Article 35 of the
Constitution of the Fifth Republic deviated only slightly from the arrangement
obtained during the Fourth Republic. It required that a declaration of war be
made by parliament, thereby implying that the government should bring forth a
proposal upon which parliament would deliberate, before the vote.171 In the
twenty-first century, following the two Iraq wars, France, like Britain,
reconsidered its constitutional arrangement regarding war powers.172 It was felt
that in the twenty-first century a declaration of war was too archaic to control
the practice of sending troops abroad for purposes of “exterior operations,” or
military ventures that would not involve the homeland.173 Still, French
legislators thought that the financial burden of a war as well as the need for the
legitimacy of the use of force necessitated parliamentary debate and
approval.174 Two Commissions, one in the National Assembly and one in the
Senate studied the matter.175 The prevailing sentiment was that the traditional
discretion granted the executive in war matters should be maintained, but that
legislative deliberations based upon timely information was imperative. In
2008 Article 35 was amended as follows:176
A declaration of war shall be authorized by Parliament. The Government
shall inform Parliament of its decision to have the armed forces intervene
abroad, at the latest three days after the beginning of said intervention. It
shall detail the objectives of the said intervention. This information may
give rise to a debate, which shall not be followed by a vote.
Where the said intervention shall exceed four months, the Government
shall submit the extension to Parliament for authorization. It may ask the
National Assembly to make the final decision.

169

1958:
De
Gaulle
Returns
to
Tackle
Algeria,
BBC,
news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/1/newsid_2995000/2995283.stm (last visited
Mar. 23, 2015) (detailing de Gaul’s political career, including his return to power in 1958).
170 Id.
171 1958 CONST. 35 (Fr.) (“La declaration de guerre est autorisee par le Parlement”).
According to Debbasch the text of the government’s proposal must refer to Article 35. See
DEBBASCH ET AL., DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES 919 (3rd ed.,
1990); see also DUVERGER, M, CONSTITUTIONS ET DOCUMENTS POLITIQUES (10th ed.,1987).
172 See Assemblee Nationale No. 890, at 15-22 (2008).
173 Id. at 16.
174 Id. at 16.
175 See Assemblee Nationale No. 890 (2008); Senate No. 388 (2008).
176 July, 9, 2008, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]; Senate Report,
June 19, 2008, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.].
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If Parliament is not sitting at the end of the four-month period, it shall
express its decision at the opening of the following session.177
Thus, the new French arrangement is somewhat similar to the
recommendations put forward in Britain and closer to the arrangement
provided by the U.S. War Powers Resolution.178 It requires that notification to
parliament be submitted rather quickly—within three days. However, it gives
the Executive enough rope to pursue military action because it does not require
a parliamentary vote that might embarrass the executive or cause a
governmental crisis. That rope, however, lasts for four months. After that, a
parliamentary authorization is required.179
D.

Israel
1.

Constitutional Framework

With the end of the British Mandate over Palestine in 1948, a ferocious war
erupted.180 The Jewish population in Palestine declared an independent Jewish
state and named it Israel.181 The United Nations endorsed the idea of a Jewish
state but neither the Palestinians nor Israel’s Arab neighbors accepted the new
state as a legitimate fait accomplit.182 Israel’s Arab neighbors invaded the state,
openly calling for its annihilation.183 From the Israeli perspective, this was a
classic war of self-defense.184 Since 1948, Israel has fought many wars: wars
of self-defense, preventive wars, and preemptive wars.185 The second war in
177

Assemblee
Nationale,
REPUBLIC
OF
FR.,
www2.assembleenationale.fr/langues/welcome-to-the-english-website-of-the-french-national-assembly (last
visited Mar. 23, 2015).
178 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C § 1541-1548 (2012) (“It is the purpose of this
chapter to . . . insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will
apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.”).
179 Note that like the British proposal, the French constitutional amendment addresses the
issue of executive action when parliament is not in session. The entire structure is more
flexible than the U.S. War Powers Resolution and tries to strike a delicate balance between
the needs of war and the needs to impose democratic oversight.
180 ANITA SHAPIRA, ISRAEL: A HISTORY 155-76 (2012).
181 Shimon Shetreet, The Grey Area of War Powers: The Case of Israel, 45 JERUSALEM
Q. 27, 27 (1988) (citing Israel’s establishment as a self-proclaimed independent state in
1948).
182 BAR-ON, supra note 37, at 23 (explaining that in 1949 a major Arabic radio station
announced: “We shall never stop planning . . . for the second round in which the Jews will
be driven from our land”)
183 KYLE, supra note 17, at 29-30 (detailing the response of Arab states when Israel
declared itself an independent nation).
184 GOLANI, supra note 27, at vi (describing Israel’s view of war with her Arab neighbors
as, “defensive . . . undertaken reluctantly in response to an Arab attack”).
185 Shetreet, supra note 181 at 27 (observing that since 1948, Israel “has been involved in
six wars”).
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this never-ending chain of wars took place in 1956, and is known as the Sinai,
or the Kadesh, Campaign.186
Israel’s Declaration of Independence explicitly expected a constitution to be
adopted after the first popular elections.187 Following the elections in 1949,
however, the assembly changed its name to the “Knesset,” and the constitution
writing project was shelved.188 A Knesset resolution stated that a series of
Basic Laws would be passed, which together would form a constitution.189 No
timetable for the project was set. By 1956 no Basic Law had yet been passed,
but two Basic Laws, one regulating the Knesset and one regulating the
executive branch, were being drafted and discussed.190 None of these statutes
addressed the matter of war powers.191 Should war be declared? By whom? In
what process? It is interesting to reflect on the question why such a central
issue, particularly vital in the case of Israel, was met with silence.192
2.

The Road to War

It may well be that the Prime Minister was taking his cue from England,
rather than from the United States or France.193 The Israeli equivalent of the
186 The title “Kadesh” harked back to the biblical epic of the Israelites’ exodus from
Egypt. According to the Bible, the Israelites camped in Kadesh before embarking on their
journey to the land of Israel. 13 Numbers 26 (“They came back to Moses and Aaron and the
whole Israelite community at Kadesh.”). Between 1948 and 1956 Israel engaged in
numerous military “raids”, some of them bearing certain features of war. Shetreet, supra
note 181, at 27 (suggesting that even when Israel was not at war, the interim periods were
marked by continued conflict.) The Sinai Campaign, while designated as a campaign to
distinguish it from an act of war, bore many features of war.
187 THE DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL (May 14, 1948),
available at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/Pages/default.aspx ([T]he Constitution . . . shall be
adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October 1948.”).
188 A. RUBINSTEIN & B. MEDINA, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 80
(6th ed., 2005).
189 AVNER YANIV, A Question of Survival: The Military and Politics Under Siege, in
NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL 96 (Avner Yaniv ed., 1993) (asserting that
the governing body agreed to work out a constitution in a piecemeal fashion, comprised of
multiple ‘basic laws’).
190 RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 188 at 713, 821.
191
Shetreet, supra note 181, at 28 (lamenting that even after a Basic Law titled The Army
was passed, “there remained many undefined areas, including the powers of the
government, its relationship to the defense minister and the ways to put into effect civilian
authority over the army.”); YANIV, supra note 189, at 96 (“The key question of who decides
what, when, and how remains in abeyance.”).
192 Matters of security and statutes related to military conscription and other aspects of
national security were vigorously debated and legislated throughout the period. It is
interesting that the one canonical tome on Israeli constitutional law, Rubinstein and Medina,
does not include a discussion of the procedures to declare or make war.
193 In general, Israelis like to think of their constitutional model as based upon the
Westminster model. A closer look shows a pastiche of various influences, from the Ottoman
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English royal prerogative was presumably, and impliedly, vested in the Israeli
cabinet.194 It is safe to expect that not much thought was given to the subject,
as Israel was expecting to fight only wars of self-defense, making a military
response imperative and in keeping with the U.N. Charter.195 Such wars
needed swift and decisive execution, and could therefore be rationally placed
in the hands of the Executive. The decision concerning a preventive or
preemptive war of choice was not contemplated and thus, one may theorize,
did not require a legal arrangement. The Israeli pattern, therefore, appears to
have been unfolding haphazardly and ad hoc.
Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was familiar with and committed to
constitutional governance. Ben-Gurion was eager to model Israel after the
Western Democratic example, including its component of the rule of law.196
He understood well that he could not be the sole decision maker when it came
to acts of war.197 This is why he brought the decision regarding Suez to the
Cabinet on October 28, 1956.198 The debate in the Cabinet was lively and
ended in an approval of the motion to launch “an action of several raids.”199
to the French and the German. The term Basic Law is borrowed from the procedure adopted
in West Germany after WWII. DANA ZARTNER, COURTS, CODES, AND CUSTOM 93 (2014)
(referencing Germany’s post-WWII reorganization via their “basic laws”).
194 Because the original Basic Law: The Government did not address the issue of war
powers, it appears that section 32 of the Basic Law applied. This section stated: “The
Government is authorized to perform in the name of the State and subject to any law, all
actions which are not legally incumbent on another authority.” BASIC LAW: THE
GOVERNMENT, 5761-2001, 23 LSI 32 (Isr.), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2001/Pages/Basic%20Law-%20The%20Government%20-2001-.aspx. See Shetreet,
Shimon, Democracy Under Conditions of War in Israel, in PEOPLE AND STATE – ISRAELI
SOCIETY 158- 160 (S. Stampler ed., 1989).
195 Indeed Israel publicly considered the Suez War to have been one of self-defense, even
though a substantial percentage of the population understood it as a war of choice, or
“milhama yezuma.” For an excellent discussion of this see Golani, Motti, Did Ben Gurion
Support or Oppose Dayan? Israel on the Road to a Preemptive War, 81 CATHEDRA 123
(1996) [hereinafter Golani Dayan].
196 NIR KEDAR, MAMLAKHTIYUT, DAVID BEN-GURION’S CIVIC THOUGHT 152-65 (2009)
197 See generally id. (explaining Ben Gurion’s political thought). The precedent to
introducing the Israeli armed forces into hostilities was set in 1955, when Ben Gurion
presented the cabinet with a motion to invade the Gaza strip. ZACH LEVEY, ISRAEL AND THE
WESTERN POWERS 20 (1997) (documenting that on March 29, 1955 Ben Gurion suggested
Israel invade Gaza). The motion failed. Id. at 20 (stating that Prime Minister Sharett
mustered a majority cabinet vote to defeat the proposal to invade Gaza). Thereafter, motions
to open hostilities (or a preventive war) were brought to the cabinet for approval. Golani,
Dayan, supra note 195, at 128.
198 Lahav, supra note 12 (“On Sunday 28 October 1956, Israel’s cabinet held its regular
weekly meeting. Ben-Gurion placed on the table a motion ‘to perform an action of several
raids.’”).
199 Id. at 69. Note that despite the British and French insistence that Israel perform “war
like acts” the prime minister avoided the term war and stuck to the description of “several

2015]

THE SUEZ CRISIS

1329

Two ministers, both members of the left-wing Mapam Party, dissented,
warning the cabinet that it was approving a preventive war the end of which
could not be foreseen.200 However, like Lord Walter Monkton, the British
Secretary of Defense, they did not resign in protest.201 They stayed and
assumed collective responsibility. Thereby, a pattern and a precedent had been
set: the Prime Minister should bring a motion to launch a war before the entire
cabinet and seek their approval by majority vote.202
The cabinet’s decision was like a cover hiding the contents of a boiling pot.
The unarticulated constitutional standard was not actually followed. By the
time Ben-Gurion convened his cabinet, the Chief of Staff had already declared
an emergency mobilization of the reserves.203 The engine of the war machine
was ignited and running. Even more importantly, the State of Israel, in utmost
secrecy and through its prime minister, had already committed in writing to
perform an act of aggressive war. The question whether the Israeli cabinet
could, at that moment, vote against the motion was merely rhetorical. In
theory, maybe yes. But in practice, the tiny and vulnerable Israel could not turn
the tables on France and Britain, the big frogs in the pond, nor would the
cabinet vote against Israel’s revered and powerful prime minister.
Upon arriving in Tel Aviv from Sèvres with the Sèvres Protocol in his breast
pocket and the cabinet meeting two days away, Ben-Gurion engaged in a
marathon of meetings with cabinet ministers representing the different
coalition parties, persuading each, one-by-one, to support the motion.204 On
Sunday, October 28, he arrived at the meeting confident that a majority of the
ministers would vote for the motion.205
raids.” Id. at 64 (“He used the term raid or raids to designate the military action on the table,
repeating it ten times during his presentation.”) He was thereby signaling alignment with
Britain and France who called their own planned acts of aggression “operation” or
“l’expedition”.
200 Id. at 63 (“Mapam, whose members opposed the motion, was represented by
ministers Mordechai Bentov . . . and Israel Barzilai.”).
201 Id. at 66 (“Following approval, the two dissenters stated that they would remain in the
cabinet rather than resign.”).
202 See id. In his book The Gates of Gaza: Israel's Road to Suez and Back, 1955-1957,
Mordechai Bar-On reports a strong disagreement with Ben-Gurion by several cabinet
members before the cabinet meeting after the prime minister return from France. BAR-ON,
supra note 37. See also MICHAEL BRECHER, DECISIONS IN ISRAEL’S FOREIGN POLICY 275-76
(1975) (stating that Ben-Gurion also informed two members of the Knesset Committee of
Foreign Affairs and Security as well as leaders of the opposition).
203 BAR-ON, supra note 37, at 298.
204 See Lahav, supra note 12, at 63 n.6 (“Ben-Gurion returned from Sèvres late on
Wednesday 24 October. As minister of defense, he had four days to prepare his military for
the attack and to persuade his cabinet for launching the war.”). The consultations continued
throughout the Sabbath. Golani, supra note 27, at 398.
205 Id. at 193 (“[T]he formal Cabinet decision was made only one day in advance [of the
attack], on October 28, without significant opposition.”).
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The Israeli cabinet, just like the British and French cabinets, was approving
a deal already done, a plan already put into motion by the Prime Minister.206
But the structure of the Israeli Cabinet was different. Ben-Gurion served as
both Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.207 Therefore, he did not need to
persuade another central decision maker, an expert in matters of defense who
enjoyed the confidence of Parliament, that this action was necessary and
legitimate.208 Nor did Ben-Gurion have a strong Minister of Foreign Affairs to
evaluate the scene from the perspective of international relations, not to
mention international law.209 Until June 1956, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
was Moshe Sharett, a man known for preferring diplomatic rather than military
solutions.210 In 1955, Sharett had led the cabinet to derail a plan by Ben-Gurion
to launch major raids or small-scale wars.211 In anticipation of a war against
Egypt, Ben-Gurion decided to dispose of this skilled and powerful
troublemaker and dissenting voice.212 In June 1956, Ben-Gurion maneuvered
Sharett out of the cabinet and appointed his close confidante, Golda Meir, in
his stead.213 As we saw above, Golda Meir did not support the proposal that
Israel play the role of aggressor and was unhappy about a war fought behind
Eisenhower’s back, but her loyalty to Ben-Gurion trumped her reservations.214
Following her expression of doubt concerning the French plans, Meir was
excluded from the inner circle of men planning the war. She was not invited to

206

Id. (“Ben-Gurion had no problems obtaining public acceptance for the decision.”).
See KYLE, supra note 17, at 79 (“On 2 November [1955] Ben-Gurion was confirmed
in office as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.”).
208 Recall that Lord Walter Monkton, Eden’s Secretary of Defense, resigned from his
position because of his doubts about the plan but stayed in the cabinet; French Minister of
Defense Bourges-Maunoury was actually the mastermind of the plan.
209 French Minister of Foreign Affairs Christian Pineau was an early supporter of the
plan. See GOLANI, supra note 27, at 117 (describing how Pineau urged the Israelis that “the
opportunity for a joint operation against Nasser should not be missed“). British Minister of
Foreign Affairs Selwyn Lloyd was skeptical and tried to negotiate a compromise with the
Egyptians, but he ultimately deferred to his Prime Minister. Id. at 118 (remarking that
Lloyd’s arrival at Sèvres surprised the French, “since they knew the depth of his objections
to collaboration with Israel”).
210 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 118 (“On the day after the Chantilly conference opened
[June 24, 1956], Moshe Sharett . . . was suddenly and brutally forced to resign.”).
211 “Operation Omer” was designed to forcibly open the Straits of Tiran shut off by
Nasser in violation of international law. See GOLANI, supra note 27, at 14 (describing
Operation Omer). The Cabinet decided to postpone an Israeli-initiated war and ultimately
cancel Operation Omer. Id. at 16-17 (discussing the Cabinet’s decision).
212 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 66 (stating that the “disharmony . . . between Ben-Gurion
and Sharett was no secret”).
213 Id. at 118 (stating that Sharett “was suddenly and brutally forced to resign”).
214 See FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 181 (“Pineau was pleased when Israeli Foreign
Minister Golda Meir agreed to pursue joint action with the French even if the British should
refuse to take part.”).
207
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the Sèvres conference.215 The relative weakness of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs in the Israeli cabinet was somewhat similar to that obtaining in the
United Kingdom. In both cases the Minister of Foreign Affairs, despite
substantial reservations, adhered to the Prime Minister’s plan and supported
him in the final cabinet meeting that approved the motion to go to war.216 On
the other hand, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christian Pineau, was
an active player in bringing the military plans to fruition.217 He remained a
Minister of Foreign Affairs after Guy Mollet had stepped down and the
hawkish Bourjès-Maunoury was sworn in as Prime Minister.218 Just like in
France, the Israeli actors who relentlessly pushed for and implemented the war
plan were the high echelons of the military and appointed officials in the
Ministry of Defense.219 Two Israelis were particularly decisive: Chief of Staff
Moshe Dayan and Director General of the Ministry of Defense Shimon
Peres.220 Even at Sèvres, Ben-Gurion kept entertaining doubts about the plan
hatched by the French, who were pushing him to accept the idea that Israel be
the chief law violator.221 Dayan and Peres, working in tandem, vigorously and
assiduously pushed Ben-Gurion to make the fateful decision.222 This state of
affairs breached one of the cardinal elements of basic constitutionalism: the
separation of the civilian and military command.223 Dayan and Peres, the first a

215 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 314-323 (discussing important figures at the Sèvres
conference).
216 Lahav, supra note 12, at 75 (“Meir, whose cabinet role should have required analysis
of the international scene, and who was savvy about international affairs, defended the plan
in generalities, ‘the world’ would condemn Israel, but ‘we shall overcome.’”).
217 FULLICK & POWELL, supra note 128, at 80-84 (describing Pineau’s participation in the
discussions and planning at Sèvres).
218 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 548 (discussing how Bourgès-Maunoury emerged as
Prime Minister).
219 Id. at 316 (stating that “[a]part from Ben-Gurion himself there were no [Israeli]
politicians” at Sèvres, but there were several military advisors).
220 Besides supplying Israel a substantial amount of arms and recognizing Israel as a
major ally in the international arena, the French also assisted Israel in building its nuclear
power plant in Dimona. See Uri Bialer, Top Hat, Tuxedo and Cannons: Israeli Foreign
Policy from 1948 to 1956 as a Field of Study, 7 ISRAELI STUD. 1, 68-69 (2002) (remarking
on Israel’s “success in forming a strategic tie with France that included assistance in
developing nuclear weapons”). Rumors have been circulating for years that the nuclear plant
was a quid pro quo for the Israeli acquiescence to take the role of aggressor and invade the
Sinai. BAR-ON, supra note 85, at 514. At Sèvres, Prime Minister Guy Mollet made it clear
to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion that the nuclear deal was tied to Israel’s willingness to play
the part of the aggressor in the Suez War.
221 See FULLICK & POWELL, supra note 128, at 81 (“To him [Ben-Gurion] it was an
abomination to see Israel condemned as an aggressor.”).
222 Id. at 84 (describing how Peres and Dayan persuaded Ben-Gurion to agree to the
plan).
223 In 1976, following the Yom Kippur War, the Knesset finally addressed this lacuna.
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military commander of great charisma and the second an ambitious civilian
appointee with no accountability to Parliament, prevailed upon the Prime
Minister to accept the offer.224 The brakes—checks and balances—expected
from a war cabinet representing various perspectives and public interests stood
out in their absence.225 When Ben-Gurion brought the motion to his cabinet on
October 28, the matter had already been decided. Indeed, a spirited debate
ensued, but the end result was not in doubt.226 The troops were ready and the
orders delivered.227 Israel was on its way to war.
3.

Aftermath: Modifying the Constitutional Framework of War Powers

The pattern established by Ben-Gurion slowly crystallized into dogma. Wars
were generally perceived as matters of self-defense, to be decided by the Prime
Minister and the Minister of Defense (until 1967 the same person) upon the
advice of the higher military echelons.228 When the Knesset passed Basic Law:
The Government (with the expectation that eventually the basic laws would be
collected into a constitution), not much thought was given to the question
Basic Law: The Military, 5736-1976, SH No. 1197, p. 418 (Isr.), available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic11_eng.htm (“The Army is subject to the
authority of the government.”). For Dayan’s zealous commitment to go to war, see
MORDECHAI BAR-ON, MOSHE DAYAN: A BIOGRAPHY 1915-1981 (2014)(Isr.). Bar-On
concludes: “It is hard to exaggerate Dayan’s role in finalizing the decision to launch the war
in the Sinai. The decision was ultimately in the hands of Ben-Gurion, but Dayan knew how
to handle his actions and his proposals in a way that will allow Ben-Gurion to reach a
positive conclusion.” Id. at 155. Michael Bar-Zohar, the biographer of Shimon Peres and a
Suez War enthusiast, emphasizes Peres’s pivotal role in bringing the idea of a war to
fruition. MICHAEL BAR-ZOHAR, SHIMON PERES: THE BIOGRAPHY 194-209 (2006) (Isr.). For a
general overview of the separation of civilian and military command, see also YORAM PERI,
GENERALS IN THE CABINET ROOM: HOW THE MILITARY SHAPES ISRAELI POLICY (2006),
particularly chapter 1 (discussing the civil-military relations in Israel). See also infra note
229.
224 FULLICK & POWELL, supra note 128, at 84 (describing how Peres and Dayan
persuaded Ben-Gurion to agree to the plan).
225 Although still shrouded in secrecy, it may well be that the French offer could be
categorized as an offer “one could not refuse.” Rumors are that the French willingness to
help Israel establish a nuclear reactor in Dimona was attached to Israel’s willingness to start
a war. Another important military consideration was France’s willingness to sell Israel more
sophisticated arms, willingness tied to Israeli cooperation in a war against Egypt. See
ELGEY, supra note 110, at 173 (describing how the nuclear deal between Israel and France
was reached).
226 See generally Lahav, supra note 12 (describing in detail the structure of the Cabinet’s
deliberations and the concerns raised during the meeting).
227 FULLICK & POWELL, supra note 128, at 84-85 (summarizing the terms of the Sèvres
Protocol, which included that Israel would launch a “strong attack” on October 29, 1956
near the Canal Zone).
228 See Lahav, supra note 12, at 64 n.10 (“[T]he policy of Israel’s government was to
conduct ‘raids’ or limited combat operations, justifying them as acts of ‘self-defense.’”).
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under whose authority should the country decide to go to war and how that
decision should be made. Following the Yom Kippur War and public outcry
concerning the vague relationship between the top military command and the
Minister of Defense (Moshe Dayan, mastermind of the Suez War), the Knesset
enacted Basic Law: The Army, which formally subordinated the military
forces to the civilian cabinet.229 In 1982, Prime Minister Menachem Begin and
his Minister of Defense, Ariel Sharon (a young officer during the Suez War),
led Israel in an invasion of Lebanon that was first presented as an act of selfdefense but soon unraveled as a war of choice.230 A year later, as the public
became increasingly critical of the government’s handling of the war,
Professor Shimon Shetreet of the Hebrew University submitted a proposal to
the Knesset to amend Basic Law: The Government and for the first time
regulate the war powers.231 This initiative led to the present Section 40 to Basic
Law: The Government, which provides:
40. (a) The state may only begin a war pursuant to a Government
decision.
(b) Nothing in the provisions of this section will prevent the adoption of
military actions necessary for the defence of the state and public security.
(c) Notification of a Government decision to begin a war under the
provision of subsection (a) will be submitted to the Knesset Foreign
Affairs and Security Committee as soon as possible; the Prime Minister
also will give notice to the Knesset plenum as soon as possible;
notification regarding military actions as stated in subsection (b) will be
given to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee as soon as
possible232

229

Basic Law: The Military, 5736-1976, SH No. 1197, p. 418 (Isr.), available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic11_eng.htm (“The Army is subject to the
authority of the Government. . . . The Minister in charge of the Army on behalf of the
Government is the Minister of Defence.”). For discussion of the constitutional responsibility
of the civilian and military echelons in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, see PNINA
LAHAv, JUDGMENT IN JERUSALEM: CHIEF JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT AND THE ZIONIST
CENTURY 229-37 (1997) (discussing how the Agranat Commission was tasked with
investigating the war and it “considered two distinct loci of responsibility: the government
and the military command”).
230 See Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Concept of National Security, in NATIONAL SECURITY
& DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL, 11, 41 (Avner Yaniv ed., 1993) (examining the distinction
between “wars of no choice” and “wars of choice” in the Lebanon War context).
231 DK (1992) 2071 (Isr.) (documenting deliberations on amendments to Basic Law: The
Government).
232 Basic Law: The Government, 5761-2001, SH No. 1780 p. 158 (Isr.), available at
https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic14_eng.htm. This section mirrors the
replaced Section 51 of Basic Law: The Government. It came into effect in 2003. Id. (“law
entered into effect with the January 2003 Knesset elections”); Basic Law: The Government,
5752-1992, SH No. 1396 p. 214 (Isr.) (repealed 2001), available at
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Section 40(a) captures the constitutional situation as applied by Prime
Minister Ben-Gurion in the Suez Crisis. The Government, presumably its
plenum rather than its “war cabinet,” is expected by law to make the decision
to go to war.233 Section 40(b), however, provides the Executive with a safety
valve that may facilitate the circumvention of the legal requirement to have the
cabinet vote on a decision to go to war.234 By providing that “nothing in the
provisions of this section will prevent the adoption of military actions
necessary for the defense of the state and public security,” this subsection in
fact allows the introduction of Israeli forces into hostilities without a full
cabinet approval if it is decided that such action is necessary for the defense of
the State.235 This subsection both proves the enormous significance of the word
“nothing” (if war is a matter of life and death then everything may hinge on
that “nothing”) and the firm conviction that various forms of war acts cannot
be squeezed into any legal formula.236 Subsection (b) does not indicate who
may make such fateful decisions. Is it the Prime Minister? The war cabinet?
The Chief of Staff? Any military officer or perhaps even a rabbi? This
arrangement captures another aspect of the Suez crisis history. Indeed, the
cabinet voted on the motion to go to war on October 28, 1956. But the contract
between Israel, France and the United Kingdom under which Israel formally
committed itself to go to war was signed at Sèvres, France on October 24.
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, jostled by Moshe Dayan, his Chief of Staff and
Shimon Peres, the Director General of the Ministry of Defense, made that
decision.237 From the perspective of constitutional authority, one elected
official (albeit revered and central) took it upon himself to commit the country
to war. It appears that this state of affairs, consciously or not, stands behind
Section 40(b). Thus, the pattern developed during the Suez Crisis has remained
as the model followed by Israel’s decision makers.

http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic7_eng.htm.
233 Section 6 of the Government Law, 2001 provides that within the government there
shall be a “national security committee” (similar to the British inner cabinet?) whose
members shall be the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, if one is appointed, the
Minister of Defense, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of
Internal Security and the Minister of the Treasury. Section 6 further provides that the
number of committee members may be expanded, provided it does not reach more than half
of the number of the members in the cabinet itself. One may expect the initial decision to go
to war to be made by the inner cabinet, but clearly Section 40(a) requires a vote by the entire
cabinet to make the decision to go to war legal. Note that the Government Law should be
distinguished from Basic Law: The Government and is designed to include technical
arrangements.
234 Basic Law: The Government, 5761-2001.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
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Section 40(c) delineates the role of the people’s representatives—the
legislature—in the context of the war powers.238 The executive branch is
expected to notify the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee and
the Prime Minister is expected to also give notice to the Knesset plenum.239
The timing contemplated by Section 40(c) structures the relationship between
the executive and the legislature in matters of war powers: the notification is
expected to take place “as soon as possible”—an ambiguous term that may
indicate that when it comes to matters of war, the Knesset is secondary to the
Executive and its schedule is controlled by the Executive.240 Action under
Section 40(b)—confirming the legitimacy of a range of actions not authorized
by the cabinet and yet valid—ignores the Knesset’s plenum altogether and
provides only for a notification to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Security
Committee.241 The term “notification” in this context is also significant. It does
not call for a reasoned explanation of why the action was necessary “for the
defense of the state or the public security” but only (presumably) for a
statement that such action had been taken.242 This arrangement should be
compared with the U.S. expectation expressed in the War Powers Resolution
as well as with the British and French efforts to enact the expectation of
legislative deliberations in a timely manner (or, better, recognizing that time is
of the essence) into the war powers paradigm.243
The history of Section 40 reveals the attachment of Israeli policymakers to
the extreme flexibility granted the Executive in matters of war powers and the
reluctance of legislators to demand a more meaningful share of this power. In
1992, following a lengthy campaign to change Israel’s electoral system in the
context of which the war powers were considered, the chair of the Judiciary
Committee conceded that the matter of war powers had to be dropped because
otherwise support for the electoral reform would fail.244 The year 1992 was one
238

Basic Law: The Government, supra note 234.
Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Note that the Minister of Defense at the time (Moshe Arens) opposed the requirement
of notification, insisting it was not necessary. Of course, the full set of parliamentary
oversight options are implicitly assumed to remain in place, from a vote of non-confidence
to a parliamentary questioning. However, it is quite likely that Cicero’s famous dictum
“Inter arma enim silent leges” is particularly applicable in this context.
243 For a discussion of the relationship between time and war, see MARY L. DUDZIAK,
WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES (2012). For example, most
Americans believe that the United States entered World War II upon the attack on Pearl
Harbor, but Dudziak shows that the nation’s entry into that war demonstrates “the use of
executive branch war-related powers outside of a declared war.” Id. at 40.
244 1 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL: LAW & GOV’T IN ISRAEL 165 (1992) (discussing an interview
with Uriel Lynn, Chair of the Judiciary Committee of the 12th Knesset) (Isr.). The electoral
reform—direct popular elections of the Prime Minister (some variation on the U.S.
presidential model) was a disappointment, and in 2003 Basic Law: The Government
239
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of constitutional rejuvenation in the Israeli political climate. Not only were
discussions of a new electoral system submitted to the Knesset, but for the first
time, two Basic Laws entrenching some basic liberal rights were enacted.245 In
this context and because of the contentious history of the 1982 Lebanon War,
there were expectations that a more structured arrangement in the matter of the
war powers could be enacted into law.246 The deliberations of the members of
the Judiciary Committee prior to the passage of Section 40 reveal two
contending camps. On the one hand were those who wished to specify in the
law that any preventive, initiated, or aggressive war would require a decision
by the plenum of the cabinet while other military acts be subjected to a variety
of lesser institutional approvals.247 In addition, this camp wanted legal
obligations placed on the Prime Minister or the Minister of Defense to appear
personally before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee when
subpoenaed to discuss the security situation.248 On the other hand were those
who preferred the status quo, arguing that Israel’s dire situation and need for
immediate, decisive action required vesting in the government a large measure
of freedom of action.249 The Ministry of Justice, representing the government,
made clear its lack of enthusiasm for any legislation on the matter. Ultimately,
the language of Section 40 mirrored the status quo ante, but made it more
restored the previous electoral system.
245 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 (Isr.), available at
http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm; Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation,
5752-1992,
SH
No.
1387
p.
60
(Isr.),
available
at
http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic5_eng.htm. These Basic Laws eventually led the
way to judicial review.
246 See Horowitz, supra note 230, at 40-44 (discussing the Lebanon War and its effects
on how the Arab-Israeli conflict was perceived).
247 The original Section 39(a) in the bill for the Basic Law stated: “The state will not
declare war and will not initiate war.” The proposal also subjected any executive decision to
the approval of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. See, e.g., DK (1992) 2073
(Isr.); DK (1991) (Isr.) (on file with author) (documenting the deliberations of the Judiciary
Committee on March 5, 1991, 12th Knesset); see also Shetreet, supra note 181, at 42-47
(calling for Israel to reform its war powers and reviewing proposals to that effect); ISRAELI
LABOR PARTY, NEW DIRECTIONS: REFORM IN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
OVER MILITARY ACTIONS (Shimon Shetreet, ed.) (on file with author). This report contains
substantive proposals for subjecting a preventive war to the decision of the cabinet plenum
and various requirements for less stringent forms of approval for a variety of other military
actions.
248 See DK (1992) 37 (Isr.) (on file with author) (statement of M.K. M. Shachal during
deliberations of the Judiciary Committee, Protocol 354, 12th Knesset on March 3, 1992). A
representative of the Ministry of Defense opposed the idea of any mandatory reporting by
the Minister of Defense. Id. at 34.
249 See, e.g., DK (1991) (Isr.) (documenting the deliberations of the Judiciary Committee,
protocol 238 on March 5, 1991, 12th Knesset). The examples of the Entebbe Operation, the
attack on the nuclear plant in Iraq, and the Six Day War were frequently raised by those
supporting a free hand to the government. Id.
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explicit as discussed above.250 A private bill to amend Section 40 and oblige
the government to make its announcement related to the opening of hostilities
“no later than forty eight hours” instead of “as soon as possible,” was
shelved.251
Efforts to engage the court in the interpretation of Section 40 were
unsuccessful. In July 2006, after the beginning of the Second Lebanon War, a
petition was brought before the High Court of Justice to require the
government to invoke Section 40(a) and declare war.252 A panel consisting of
Chief Justice D. Beinisch, Justice A. Procaccia, and Justice E. Arbel, all
women, rejected the petition. Israel has indeed gone a long way since 1956 to
include women on the high court and thereby include women in making
decisions related to war. But the parameters of the debate remained the same.
The Government argued that it was acting on the basis of Section 40(b) rather
than Section 40(a).253 Speaking for the Court, the Chief Justice held that
“under the circumstances the government could decide that the military action
referred not to starting a war but rather military action for self defense in
reaction to aggression.”254 At the same time, the Court also held that Section
40(a) was in fact followed because the plenary of the government made the
decision and reported its decision and actions to the Foreign Affairs and
Security Committee.255 The opinion ended by stating that “[t]he way by which
the government acted. . .fits its authority and the range of discretion vested in it
250

The language of Section 40 was incorporated into a proposal for a constitution for
Israel by Professor Ariel Bendor, published in 5 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL: LAW & GOV’T IN
ISRAEL 23 (1999) (Isr.), thereby giving it additional scholarly support.
251 Private bill submitted on May 6, 2002. Operation Defensive Shield in the context of
the Second Palestinian Intifada started a few weeks earlier. Evidently the nineteen
legislators who proposed the bill sought some interaction with the executive. P/15/3701. A
long discussion in the judiciary committee concerning the meaning of Section 40 took place
in 2003. The Judiciary Committee, appointing itself as a “committee to pass a constitution
based on nation-wide consensus, assembled an array of high level legal counsel and scholars
to discuss who is the more appropriate branch of the government to make the decision to
open a war. Some insisted that only the executive could make fast and efficient decisions
and that “legal niceties” should not obstruct its ability to act. On the other hand, the scholars
included in the committee leaned more towards parliamentary approval of decisions to go to
war. It does not appear that the committee reached any conclusions and the matter appears
to have been dropped. Protocol 112, December 15, 2003, 16th Knesset (on file with author).
252 HCJ 6204 / 06 Beilin v. Prime Minister (2) IsrLR 99 [2006] (Isr.). Professor Beilin, a
political scientist, served in several labor governments from 1995 through 2001.
253 Id. at 106 (“[T]he government saw no reason in the present situation why it should
make use of its power under s. 40(a) of the Basic Law: the Government; according to its
outlook, it is carrying out military operations in accordance with s. 40(b) of the Basic Law:
the Government . . . .”).
254 Id. at 108 (author’s translation).
255 Id. at 108 (“Even though the government decided that the military activity in Lebanon
falls within the scope of the provisions of s. 40(b) of the Basic Law, de facto it also carried
out all of the procedures stipulated in the law that are relevant to a decision under s. 40(a).”).
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and therefore there is no cause for our intervention.”256 It should not be
surprising to see the Court avoid the constitutional questions and refuse to take
a stand in such matters. Yet, it is encouraging to see the Government reflect
awareness of its limits and make an effort to reason its actions in terms of the
law. Israel does not appear to be ready to follow the United States, the United
Kingdom, or France and provide for substantial legislative involvement in the
matters of war powers, but it does appear that some measure of parliamentary
involvement has been achieved.
II.
A.

THE UNITED STATES

Diplomacy: The U.S. Reaction to the Eruption of War in the Middle East

As stated above, once Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, the United States
was intent on trying to achieve a diplomatic solution to the crisis.257 Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles largely engineered the diplomatic effort in
cooperation with the United Nations.258 American intelligence closely
monitored the movement of forces in the area around the canal and
documented British, French, and Israeli military maneuvers of a character
indicating preparations for an impending war.259 President Eisenhower and his
administration strongly warned the parties numerous times to refrain from any
aggressive action.260 From the American perspective, the fact that the three
belligerents succeeded in keeping their impending attack plans secret must
have been experienced as a serious intelligence failure and a devastating
betrayal of friendship, at least on the part of the British government.261 To add

256 Id. at 108-09 (“[T]he manner in which the government acted in making the decisions
under discussion is consistent with its powers and the scope of discretion given to it, and it
does not give rise to any ground for our intervention . . . .”).
257 There is voluminous literature on U.S./Egypt relations since Nasser’s rise to power.
See, e.g., Peter Hahn, National Security Concerns in U.S. Policy Toward Egypt, 1949-1956,
in THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL REASSESSMENT
91, 97 (David W. Lesch, ed., 1996) (“Eisenhower sought to use diplomacy to delay a British
attack, on the calculation that time would cool British tempers and avert war.”); JEAN
EDWARD SMITH, EISENHOWER IN WAR AND PEACE 694-95 (2012) (discussing Eisenhower’s
insistence that “Egypt was within its rights” and that war should be avoided).
258 See, e.g., FREIBERGER, supra note 7 at 164 (1992) (discussing Dulles’s trip to London
for an international conference in August 1956 to discuss international control of the Canal);
SMITH, supra note 257, at 698 (describing Dulles’s presentation of the United States’ ceasefire resolution to the U.N. General Assembly).
259 FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 184-86 (“Eisenhower administration officials were well
aware that something serious was about to occur . . . .”).
260 SMITH, supra note 257, at 695-97 (describing Eisenhower’s efforts to avert war).
261 Id. at 697 (“[Eisenhower] felt he had been betrayed by [British Prime Minister] Eden
and was furious.”).
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injury to insult, the attack took place one week before the presidential
election.262
Following the Israeli invasion but before the issuance of the ultimatum by
Britain and France, President Eisenhower suspended much of his political
campaign and focused on international affairs. His demand that Israel
withdraw amounted to an ultimatum.263 Two days later, when he realized the
British and French involvement, he immediately suspected collusion among
the two European powers and Israel and was torn between two reactions.264
Britain had been the United States’ most trusted and closest ally during WWII.
It was also a senior member of NATO and a staunch ally in the Cold War.265
There is evidence that had the British implemented their plans of attack swiftly
and come to control the Canal, the President might have turned a blind eye to
the invasion.266 But Prime Minister Eden decided to stall military action.267 He
thought that if the United Kingdom appeared as a responsible world power
simply trying to restore order in the region (rather than as an active partner in
the operation aimed at restoring the status quo ante), its prestige and legitimacy
would be preserved.268 Recall that the Sèvres agreement stipulated that Israeli
forces would approach the Canal, thereby appearing to threaten its safety.269
That was the pretext Eden believed he needed in order to issue an ultimatum
and make the United Kingdom appear to be interfering solely in order to
restore peace.270 Eden was determined to show the world that the British and
French intervention was motivated by a desire to uphold the rule of
international law. This was his reason to delay the British assault in the Canal
area.271 But from Eisenhower’s perspective the delay was fatal.272 As the hours
262

Id. The 43rd presidential elections took place on November 6, 1956.
BRECHER, supra note 202, at 286-88.
264 NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 207 (“Ike was . . . arguing with himself whether to be tough
or diplomatic with the allies who had double-crossed him.”).
265 See id. at 203 (recalling that the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 stated that America,
Britain, and France “would support any victim of aggressions in the Middle East”).
266 LUCAS, supra note 57, at 265 (“Even Eisenhower was prepared to accept a fait
accompli if intervention was quick and successful.”).
267 Id. (“Britain’s only possible salvation was delaying the passage of an Assembly
resolution long enough to take control of the Suez Canal Zone, possibly provoking the
Egyptians to overthrow Nasser.”).
268 FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 184 (“The Sevres plan created an option [for the British]
to remove Nasser with the possibility of retaining world opinion.”).
269 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 188 (describing the plan set forth in the agreement at
Sèvres).
270 Id. (“The plan was that once the Israelis began to advance toward the Suez Canal
Zone, Britain and France would issue an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt to cease fighting and
accept Anglo-French occupation of the Canal Zone. If Egypt, as expected, rejected the
ultimatum, Britain and France would begin bombardment on October 31, followed by troop
landings.”).
271 Both France and Israel were extremely frustrated by Eden’s decision but had to defer
263
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passed, delay in the Anglo-French assault tilted the pendulum. Already furious
at being betrayed, he decided to take the moral high ground, emphasize the
supremacy of the United Nations’ Charter, and coerce the Europeans to abort
their mission.273 Only at that moment, then, did the United States decide to
abandon the path of real politick and embark on the path of moralism.
B.

U.S. President’s Constitutional Powers in the Service of Diffusing the
International Crisis and Avoiding a War

What were the constitutional mechanisms through which the President
accomplished his plan to subvert the Suez War? He actively used four powers
and refrained from using a fifth.274
1.

The President’s Implied Power as “Sole Organ” of Foreign Affairs275

In public, President Eisenhower, as well as his Secretary of State, John
Foster Dulles, condemned Britain and France for a gross violation of the
United Nations Charter.276 He ordered his ambassador to the United Nations,
Henry Cabot Lodge, to call an emergency meeting of the Security Council

to him, as among the three, the United Kingdom was the superior military power. See
GOLANI, supra note 27, at 185-87 (explaining that Israel needed France to supply it with
arms, and that “France, for all its military readiness, felt itself dependent on Britain in every
aspect of a possible strike against Egypt”).
272 “Eisenhower, as a military man, was harshly critical of the Anglo-French military
operations saying that ‘there was no excuse for the long delay in the landing of . . . troops . .
. once they had made the decision to do so.’” NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 261 (quoting
Eisenhower’s statement at a National Security Council meeting on November 8).
273 See Smith, supra note 257, at 697. Both sides to the conflict emphasized their moral
loyalty to the rule of law, evidently an indeterminate concept.
274 Question not addressed: If Eisenhower lost and Adlai Stevenson were elected
president on November 6, 1956, and if Stevenson indicated his preference to support the
European Powers, would Eisenhower’s constitutional powers, which he could use until
inauguration in January, be less potent? Note, too, in this context that following the 1956
elections both houses of Congress were in the hands of the Democrats. See Nancy Amoury
Combs, Carter, Reagan, and Khomeini: Presidential Transitions and International Law, 52
Hastings L.J. 303, 305, 335 (2001) (“[L]ame ducks have typically commanded little ability
to conduct foreign affairs even if they desired to. That is, once an administration has lost an
election, foreign governments usually shift their focus to the incoming administration.”
(Footnote omitted)); see generally Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83
B.U. L. REV. 947 (2003) (discussing administrative law issues regarding presidential power
during transitions).
275 See U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (discussing the
“plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in
the field of international relations”).
276 See FREIBERGER, supra note 7 at 192 (1992) (explaining the United States’ position as
encapsulated in the “American-sponsored resolution calling for a cease-fire, the withdrawal
of Israeli, French, and British forces, and the reopening of the canal”).

2015]

THE SUEZ CRISIS

1341

where a strongly worded resolution condemning the invasion was proposed.277
Britain and France, foreseeing this move, used their power as Security Council
members and vetoed the resolution.278 They expected their veto to put the
matter to rest.
Eisenhower was adamant not to let the matter go and had more tricks in his
bag to accomplish his plan. Thus, the expectation that the veto mechanism
would put the matter to rest was thwarted by another structural process enabled
by the Charter.
In 1950, during the crisis in Korea, the United States led the United Nations
General Assembly in passing the Uniting for Peace resolution, enabling the
General Assembly to consider security matters vetoed by one of the five
permanent members of the Security Council.279 This resolution was passed by
the Western powers against the invocation of a veto in the Security Council by
the Soviet Union.280 Now it was invoked against two of NATO’s most senior
members.281 In public, Eisenhower’s justification for this quite startling and
unexpected move was the equal protection of the laws.282 All United Nations
members are bound by its charter and none shall be allowed to violate its

277

Id.
U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3 (“Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters
shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of
the permanent members.”). It should be noted that this was the first time that the United
Kingdom exercised its veto power. See S.C. Res. 119, U.N. Doc. S/1956/3721 (Oct. 31.
1956) (“The Security Council, considering that a grave situation has been created by action
undertaken against Egypt, taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent
members at the 749th and 750th meetings of the Security Council has prevented it from
exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,
decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly, as provided in
General Assembly resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950, in order to make appropriate
recommendations.”).
279 Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. 377 (V) A (Nov. 3, 1950) (“[I]f the Security
Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security . . . the
General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately.”).
280 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 365.
281 See id. (“Only on the morning of 29 October, just before news of the Israeli attack
came through to New York, Henry Cabot Lodge had been speaking to his French and
British colleagues of using the procedure for the first time against the behavior of the Soviet
forces in Hungary. Now it was to be used, not against Russia but against Britain and
France.”).
282 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 226 (“In a rare rhetorical flourish, he expanded the core
principle of the Fourteenth Amendment, ‘equal protection of the laws,’ to apply to
international affairs: ‘As there can be no second-class citizens before the law in America,’
he asserted, ‘there can be no second-class nations before the law of the world
community.’”). The fingerprints of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) are
quite evident.
278
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principles.283 The General Assembly convened immediately following the
veto’s invocation, the Soviet Union joined the United States in condemning the
aggressors (while its tanks were occupying Budapest), and a variety of
sanctions were considered.284 The Assembly remained in session between
November 1 and November 10 and, with vigorous American leadership and
Soviet support tightened the noose around the two European powers until they
accepted defeat and announced withdrawal.285
2.

The President’s Powers as Commander-in-Chief

Eisenhower immediately declared that the British and French attack
amounted to a violation of the tri-partite agreement of 1950.286 The President
understood well that relying on the tri-partite agreement might lead to U.S.
intervention to restore the status quote ante. Eisenhower ordered the Sixth
Fleet, stationed in the Mediterranean, to be on high alert.287 While he was
contemplating further action, Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin issued a
statement condemning the Suez invasion and threatening military intervention
to defend Egypt’s sovereignty.288 These warnings, interpreted to mean a Soviet
threat to use nuclear weapons against the European powers,289 placed
Eisenhower in a terrible dilemma.290 The United States had an obligation under
the tri-partite agreement, but now it was experiencing a conflicting obligation
under the NATO treaty to defend Britain and France against Soviet
283 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2 (“All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the
rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.”).
284 The United States and the Soviets found themselves to be unlikely allies in the
Security Council. See FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 192 (“In the Security Council the United
States found itself awkwardly and uncomfortably in agreement with the Soviet Union . . .
.”).
285 See id. at 192-96 (suggesting that because of American and Soviet efforts in the
Security Council, the British “cabinet agreed to open negotiations with the United Nations
commander to transfer British-occupied areas to his control [and] [t]he British succumbed to
American coercion”).
286 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 203-04 (discussing Eisenhower’s concerns that French
and British intervention would force America to intervene under the Tri-Partite Declaration
of 1950 because “America could not afford to appear like ‘we are a nation without
honor.’”).
287 See id. at 246-47 (“The [Joint Chiefs of Staff] viewed the situation as the closest they
had come to war with the Soviet Union since World War II, so the entire Navy was directed
to ‘maintain readiness to implement emergency war plans.’”).
288 See id. at 244 (describing Soviet statements that they intended “to crush the aggressor
and reestablish peace in the [Middle] East by using force”).
289 These warnings also threatened Israel’s very survival.
290 See id. at 245 (explaining that Bulganin proposed that the United States and the
Soviet Union work together in the Middle East by issuing “an ultimatum to the combatants,
announce a readiness to intervene, and jointly mobilize their naval fleets”).
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aggression.291 Matters soon got much more complicated. Rumors began to
circulate that Soviet intervention on behalf of Egypt was imminent.292 In
Washington, on November 6, Election Day, the Joint Chiefs convened, made
plans “to improve readiness for a general war,” and informed the President that
he should immediately return to the White House from his stay in
Gettysburg.293 Once the President returned the meeting at the White House was
“nothing less than a council of war.”294 Using his powers as Commander-inChief, Eisenhower issued an order to put “the Sixth Fleet and the Atlantic and
Pacific fleets on battle-ready alert, deploying additional ships, submarines, and
tactical air resources, and placing heavy troop carrier wings on the twelve-hour
alert.”295 Once the orders were in place, the President drove to the Sheraton
Park Hotel, to watch the election returns.296 He won by a wide margin.297 It is a
part of the nature of war that it is often earnestly justified, even in the minds of
the decision-makers themselves, as a means to defend peace. As the United
States was preparing for war, the President-elect told the American people that
he would continue to work “for peace in the world.”298
291

See id. at 247 (describing the United States’ response to Soviet aggression, where the
joint chiefs moved American ships into a position “where they would be interspersed with
the British and French navies—a move designed to say to the Soviet Union, in the words of
a subsequent top secret study by the Navy, that ‘an attack on one would be an attack on
all.’”).
292 See id. at 247 (explaining the Soviet’s warning messages “demanding that Britain,
France, and Israel implement a cease-fire within twelve hours and withdraw from Egypt
within three days or be faced with the prospect of American and Soviet Union military
assistance to Egypt”).
293 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 252-53 (“[E]veryone agreed it was essential to ask the
president, without fanfare, to come back as quickly as possible.”). Eisenhower and his wife
drove to Gettysburg to vote in the elections. Id. at 250.
294 Id. at 253. In attendance were eighteen men, the vice president and the top leadership
of the Defense and State departments, including the Joint Chiefs. Id.
295 Id. at 257 (citing President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Joint Chiefs to Certain
Commanders (Nov. 6, 1956) in DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1957, SUEZ CRISIS, JULY 26-DECEMBER 31, 1956,
VOLUME XVI, at 1035-36 (Nina J. Noring & John P. Glennon eds., 1990).
296 See id. at 253 (“About ten that evening, the Eisenhowers, friends, and family traveled
to the Sheraton Park Hotel, where a suite had been reserved for watching the election
returns.).
297 See id. (“Even though it had become apparent earlier in the evening that the president
had won reelection by a huge margin, Eisenhower did not go downstairs to address
supporters until 1:45 a.m.”).
298 Id. at 257 (citing President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Radio and Television Remarks
Following the Election Victory (Nov. 7, 1956) in DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, PUBLIC PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1956, at 1089-91 (1999) (“I conclude with a pledge: with whatever
talents the good God has given me, with whatever strength there is within me, I will
continue—and so will my associates—to do just one thing: to work for 168 million
Americans here at home—and for peace in the world.”). An experienced war general, he
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Recognition Powers

Eisenhower was simultaneously handling the Suez Crisis and the Soviet
invasion and occupation of Hungary on November 4, 1956, which unfolded
precisely as the Suez Crisis was escalating.299 It was not easy to commit the
United States’ forces to the rule of international law against its own allies
while simultaneously ignoring the flagrant violation of the same principles by
its Moscow archrival.300 In other words, it was awkward to apply moralism
when it came to Suez and realpolitik when it came to Hungary. Eisenhower
considered breaking off diplomatic relations with Moscow.301 He had full
power to do so under Article II’s recognition powers and such a move would
have demonstrated a more even treatment of both crises and all perpetrators.302
But the President decided it would be a futile gesture. The United States had
long accepted Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Thus the policy based on
moralism was applied against America’s historic friends while the policy of
realpolitik was applied against it declared enemies.303
must have known that while his battle ready order could act as a mere deterrent, preventing
the Soviets from starting a war, the order could still ignite violence between the
superpowers.
299 See id. at 238 (describing the “perfect storm” brewing on November 4, 1956 as the
Suez crisis “mixed with the growing crisis in Eastern Europe).
300 See id. at 239 (illustrating the gravity of Soviet actions on November 4, 1956 when
“the Soviets delivered a four-hour ultimatum to the Hungarians stating that if their
government did not capitulate, Soviet forces would bomb Budapest. Later that day, the
Russians sent 200,000 troops and four thousand tanks into Hungary”).
301 See id. at 261 (highlighting that although Eisenhower called Soviet actions in
Hungary “a bitter pill for us to swallow,” he ultimately concluded that “breaking off
diplomatic relations with Moscow would accomplish nothing.”).
302 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that the President “shall receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 011, at 1 (2015)
(“The Constitution vests in the President the power to make treaties and appoint
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate. By derivation from these Constitutional provisions, the President exercises primary
authority and responsibility for the formulation and execution of foreign policy.”). President
Eisenhower did not believe breaking off relations with Moscow was a viable solution. See
NICHOLS, supra note xx, at 261 (“By this time, thousands of Hungarians had died and more
than 200,000 refugees were pouring across Hungary’s borders into neighboring states. Ike
had concluded that breaking off diplomatic relations with Moscow would accomplish
nothing.”).
303 But note persistent indications that had Britain swiftly and resolutely occupied the
Canal Zone, Eisenhower may have accepted the move and avoided the steps described
herein. See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 233 (describing the United States’ position that Britain
should either “comply with the goddamn cease-fire or go ahead with the goddamn invasion.
Either way, we’ll back ‘em up if they do it fast. What we can’t stand is their goddamn
hesitation waltz while Hungary is burning”).
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Powers as Head of the Vast Federal Bureaucracy

The reference to “politics” as distinct from “war” in Von Clausewitz’s
famous maxim is fully illustrated in the economic pressures placed on Britain
during the crisis.304 Historians agree that political and economic pressures
indeed led to the collapse of the Anglo-French operation in Suez.305 These
pressures were expressed in two ways: monetary pressure and the manipulation
of oil supply.306 In the financial markets, the pound sterling had been
weakening since the nationalization of the Canal in July 1956. However,
immediately following the invasion there occurred a “run on the pound.”307 In
the first two days of the British invasion of Egypt, Britain lost $50 million in
currency reserves, and “speculation accelerated against the pound in currency
markets.”308 Therefore, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer (minister of
the treasury) asked the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) to return British
funds previously paid into the fund.309 The U.S. Treasury Department declined
the request.310 There was little doubt that that action by the U.S. Department of
Treasury was orchestrated by the White House and was not based on strict
rules.311 Rather, the Treasury Department’s decision was based upon executive

304

See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 12 (J. J. GRAHAM trans., 3d German ed. 1873)
(“War is a mere continuation of policy by other means.”); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. Lessons from
the Balkans for American Foreign Policy: Building Civil Society Within a Multilateral
Framework, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 229, 235 n.6 (2002) (noting that other translations commonly
render Von Clausewitz’s maxim as “war is the continuation of politics by other means”).
305 See FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 195 (“The British were now faced with the U.S.
Federal Reserve Board selling British currency, Washington’s refusal to advance a
temporary loan, and American obstruction to withdraw money from the IMF.”).
306 See id. at 197 (“For the duration of the crisis, two issues dominated British policy: the
mechanics of British withdrawal, and the clearing of the canal to permit the resumption of
oil shipments.”).
307 See id. at 194 (“The next day a run on the pound developed, and the British situation
grew increasingly critical.”).
308 NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 251; see also FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 190-92 (“By
November 2 the United Kingdom had lost $50 million in gold reserves, and confidence in
sterling was declining.”).
309
NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 251 (“Harold Macmillan, the chancellor of the exchequer . .
. had anxiously asked the International Monetary Fund to return the British quota—the
funds his government had previously paid into the fund.”); FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 196
(describing the United States’ warnings “that if the United Kingdom pulled its gold and
dollars out of the IMF, the British could be heading toward bankruptcy”).
310 See id. at 194 (describing that the U.S. Treasury Department declined to extend
assistance to Britain until “a cease-fire were arranged”).
311 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 251 (“While the British cabinet was in session the
morning of November 6, Macmillan learned that the American Treasury Department—no
doubt following Eisenhower’s orders—had vetoed the return of the IMF funds until Great
Britain agreed to a cease-fire.”).
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discretion.312 Following Britain’s decision to fully withdraw, the IMF
reciprocated by abiding by the British request to withdraw funds from the
IMF.313 Throughout November, Harold Macmillan, the British Secretary of the
Treasury, urged George Humphrey, his American counterpart, to release IMF
funds to Britain to no avail.314 Once the British decision to abide by all the
United States conditions was announced, the Treasury Department reversed its
position.315 Something must have happened during the meeting between the
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and the British delegation:
At the beginning of their meeting on December 3, Humphrey continued
to insist that his government could not support a large-scale support
operation from the IMF. Then, quite abruptly and to the astonishment of
his visitors, he swept aside those worries and proposed that the British
should draw $561 million immediately and take out a stand-by
arrangement for another $739 million, a massive total package of $1.3
billion (100 percent of the U.K. quota in the IMF).316

312

See id. See also KYLE, supra note 17, at 500-03 (discussing tensions between the
United Kingdom and the United States during the UK’s attempts to obtain financing from
the IMF); HAROLD MACMILLAN, RIDING THE STORM 1956-1959, at 163-68 (1971) (reporting
the U.S. Government’s opposition to allowing Great Britain to draw on IMF funds “as a
breach of spirit, and even of the letter of the system under which the Fund is supposed to
operate”); TURNER, supra note 17, AT 255-58 (discussing the tension between the American
government, including President Eisenhower, and the British government over the
withdrawal of IMF funds). Nichols reports that “the denial of that request nurtured
suspicions among British leaders that the rampant speculation on the pound ‘was being
stimulated by the United States Treasury.’” NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 251. For an analysis
of the monetary crisis, see Adam Klug & Gregor W. Smith, Suez and Sterling, 1956
(Queen’s
Econ.
Dep’t,
Working
Paper
No.
1256),
available
at
http://core.kmi.open.ac.uk/download/pdf/6494165.pdf.
313 See FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 203 (explaining that once Britain complied with the
United States’ requests, “[t]he financial aid which the British required was granted as well
as a new loan with satisfactory terms for repayment”).
314
See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 194 (“On the morning of the 6th [of November]
Macmillan telephoned U.S. Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey seeking
assistance.”).
315 See James M. Boughton, Was Suez in 1956 the First Financial Crisis of the TwentyFirst
Century?,
38
FIN.
&
DEV.
(2001),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/boughton.htm (discussing the causal link
between Britain’s agreement to withdraw and the IMF’s approval of funding. The IMP
approved Britain’s funding request “and Britain immediately made the drawing of $561
million to replenish its reserves and announced that it had another $739 million available on
stand-by”).
316 Id.
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Humphrey also announced that his department would recommend that
Congress immediately waive $143 million in interest payments on a World
War II loan due December 31.317
The other matter of critical importance was oil. The Suez crisis shut off two
of the three major oil supply routes to Europe: the Canal itself, blocked by
eight or nine ships sunk there by Egypt, and the Iraq pipeline.318 As a result,
Europe was facing a serious oil shortage and winter had already entered the
gate.319 The threat to the European economies was evident. The United States
could and eventually did help, but it exacted the same price it was demanding
in relation to the monetary crisis: unconditional British withdrawal.320 United
States help took the form of encouraging U.S. oil companies to increase oil
production.321 But Eisenhower feared that an open decision to increase oil
production might exacerbate Arab rage at the invasion and might result in an
Arab oil embargo.322 Deceptive tactics and secrecy came to the rescue. The
White House “approved the movement of U.S. Gulf Coast oil to the East Coast
in foreign-flag tankers, a move designed to camouflage preparations for
sending it to Europe.”323 In addition, on November 30 the U.S. Office of
317

See Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President in Augusta,
Georgia, and the Secretary of State in Washington (Dec. 3, 1956), in DEP’T OF STATE,
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1957, SUEZ
CRISIS, JULY 26-DECEMBER 31, 1956, VOLUME XVI, at 1240 (Nina J. Noring & John P.
Glennon, eds., 1990) (stating that “George Humphrey was prepared to give clearance to”
Macmillan’s statement to “the House of Commons that the U.S. Treasury would recommend
to the U.S. Congress that it waive $143 million interest payment on a World War II loan,
due on December 31”).
318 See Memorandum of Discussion at the 303d Meeting of the National Security Council
(Nov. 8, 1956), available at http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/nss/documents/eisenhowersuez-hungarian-crises.html [hereinafter NSC Memorandum] (explaining that the “Suez
Canal was now thoroughly blocked by at least eight or nine ships which had been sunk in it.
The Iraq pipeline had been sabotaged and three of its pumping stations destroyed. The
Aramco tapline was still intact, but it was touch-and-go as to how long it would remain”);
see also TURNER, supra note 17, at 249 n.49 (citing reports from The Times of London and
The Economist that discussed the oil routes from the Middle East and the effects that the
closure of the Suez Canal had on these routes).
319 See TURNER, supra note 17, at 249 n.49 (noting that as of November 1956, Europe
faced a loss of 94 million tons of oil that would normally come from the Suez Canal and the
Northern Pipeline).
320 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 262-63 (discussing Eisenhower’s requirement of “the
equivalent of unconditional surrender from the British and French” before providing their
“needed supplies of oil”).
321 See id. at 261 (discussing the United States’ support of Britain through American oil
production).
322 See id. (“Eisenhower asked . . . if American oil production could be increased without
appearing to the Arab nations to be ‘bailing out the British and the French.’”).
323 See id. at 261 (citing NSC Memorandum, supra note 318, which explained that the
President approved “[a]uthoriz[ing] the movement of U.S. Gulf Coast oil to the U.S. East
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Defense Mobilization “released a statement that, ‘with the approval of the
President,’ the Interior Department had been requested to authorize fifteen
American oil companies to coordinate efforts to provide oil to compensate for”
the shortage resulting from the crisis.324
5.

The Power Not Used: Interacting with Congress

Eisenhower refrained from using his power under Article II, section 3 to “on
extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them.”325 Article II
section 3 clearly gives the President discretion to convene both or either house,
but does not require him to do so. There is evidence that Eisenhower
considered calling Congress for a special session, but he ultimately decided
against it326 Congress only came into play a month later in January 1957.327
The Congress was in the hands of the Democrats, and Eisenhower might have
thought that it would not be entirely supportive of his determination to
abandon a major Western Power and thereby support two hostile powers,
Egypt’s leader Nasser and the Soviet Union.328 Domestic politics also play a
part in mighty decisions related to matters of war and peace.329
Coast in foreign-flag tankers”). Compare this “camouflage operation” to the French
camouflaging its troops and airplanes as Israeli at the beginning of the Suez operation. See
KYLE, supra note 17, at 343-44 (“In accordance with the bilateral section of the Protocol of
Sѐvres, the two French squadrons—thirty-six Mystѐres and F84s—took up their position on
Israeli airfields on the eve of battle.”).
324 NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 273 (citing Circular Telegram From the Department of
State to All Diplomatic Missions, Legations, and the Mission at the United Nations (Nov.
29, 1956), in DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1955-1957, SUEZ CRISIS, JULY 26-DECEMBER 31, 1956, VOLUME XVI, at
1214 (Nina J. Noring & John P. Glennon, eds., 1990) that the Director of the Office of
Defense Mobilization with the President’s approval “today requested the Secretary of the
Interior to authorize fifteen US oil companies to coordinate the efforts they have been
making individually to assist in handling the oil supply problem resulting from the closing
of the Suez Canal and some pipelines in the Middle East”).
325 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
326 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 527 (stating that since Congress had not met since the
elections, there were “’dramatic secret meetings of the Committee’ [that] were held ‘after
dark one evening before Congress was even organised, in an atmosphere of suspense and
urgency”). This may be compared to both British and French concern for activating war
power when parliament is not in session. Compare supra note 64 and accompanying text
(describing that although the power to declare war does not require consulting Parliament,
Parliamentary votes of no confidence are a method to control the Executives’ use of the war
powers), with supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing Article 7 of the French
Constitution which requires a vote of the National Assembly before war powers are
activated).
327 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 275-77 (“As 1957 dawned, Eisenhower launched a
legislative offensive that, by any measure, was breathtaking.”).
328 See id. at 265 (“While he had won a second term with 57 percent of the vote and 45773 in the Electoral College, Ike still faced a Democratic Congress with a two-seat majority
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With the defeat of the two European-Colonial powers, brought about
through the deft deployment of his Article II powers, the President confronted
a vacuum created by his own actions. Because the Middle East was understood
in the West strictly in terms of the Cold War, the concern was to chiefly
prevent the Soviet Union from further benefitting from that change.330 It was
thus that the United States escalated its involvement in the Middle East. This
could not have been accomplished through Article II powers, as potent as they
were. Money had to be allocated and further powers to act had to be
authorized.331 Here Griffin’s cycle of accountability332 and Zeisberg’s
relational theory333 come into play. On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower
in the Senate and a thirty-three-seat margin in the House.”).
329 See GRIFFIN, supra note 2, at 258 (“There is a reasonable amount of evidence that
presidents have made decisions for war based in part on considerations of domestic
politics.”).
330 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 278 (“A Middle East split into two armed camps, one
committed to the West and the other to the Soviet Union, could set the stage for
Armageddon. To Eisenhower, this meant heading off any Soviet effort to gain a significant
foothold in the region.”).
331 The history of the relationship between Congress and the Executive in the area of
foreign policy (including war making) powers are beyond the scope of this article. It is
worth taking account of the ebb and flow of this relationship during the 20th century and
beyond. By the mid-1950s Executive power to form foreign policy and introduce U.S.
forces into hostilities was somewhat beyond its WWII peak but was still quite potent. See
ROBERT DAVID JOHNSON, CONGRESS AND THE COLD WAR xvii (2006) (describing in the
1950s the “post war constitutional revolution, characterized by the dramatic decline of
congressional power over war and treaties”). It would take Congressional leaders more time
to infuse power and influence into Congress’ potential foreign policy powers. See id. at 71
(“Over the next several years, however, various members [of Congress] would discover
alternative ways of marshaling the institution’s powers: focusing on foreign policy issues
related to appropriations, using the proliferation of subcommittees to influence policy, or
highlighting issues or areas of the world neglected by the administration.”). As historian
Robert David Johnson observed in his “Congress and the Cold War,” these constitutional
powers were more subtle and went beyond the salient power to approve treaties and declare
war. See id. at xxiii (“Understanding the congressional response to the Cold War, however,
requires looking beyond instances when Congress did (or did not) declare war or approve
treaties.”). Instead, other facets of legislative power become important: “the spending
measures [appropriations power]; the internal workings of a Congress increasingly
dominated by subcommittees; and the ability of individual legislators to affect foreign
affairs by changing the way that policymakers and the public thought about international
questions—qualities inherently more difficult for historians to measure.” Id.
332 See Griffin, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing the “cycle of accountability” as interbranch interaction between the executive and legislative branches where “each branch
knows that its decisions will be reviewed by the other” and a “pattern of mutual testing and
deliberation results”).
333 See ZEISBERG, supra note 3, at 13-19 (“I argue that the branches’ powerful
governance and epistemic capacities can be used to support constructions of constitutional
war powers that are well adapted to the security context of their own time.”).
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delivered a special message to Congress.334 He announced what came to be
known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, which initiated American presence in the
Middle East.335 The doctrine provided that a country could request American
economic and/or military aid if it was being threatened by armed aggression
from another state.336 It was expected that threats will come from the Soviet
Union.337
Inter-branch negotiations ended with a more moderate and balanced bill
than Eisenhower had wanted.
On January 1, 1957, [the President] . . . invited a bipartisan legislative
delegation to the White House. In a four-hour conference, he outlined a
draft resolution giving him authority to send troops to any Middle Eastern
nation that requested assistance against a Communist threat, on the
grounds ‘that modern war might be a matter of hours only . . . Under a
closed rule, the resolution sailed through the House, whose institutional
structure prevented forcefully challenging the executive against the
leadership’s wishes. In the Senate, the president received overwhelming
Republican support . . . A wide array of Democrats, on the other hand,
questioned the resolution’s constitutional, policy, and pragmatic
necessity, but they struggled to reconcile their positions with their
previous expansive interpretations of presidential power.338
This joint resolution was “a vaguely worded resolution targeted at a region
the administration could not precisely define to meet a threat that the
administration could not specifically identify.”339
Counterfactuals come into play. Had Congress been fully consulted earlier,
could American involvement in the Middle East look different? Is this a story
that supports the idea that at least when it comes to war, collective judgment,
334 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 276 (describing Eisenhower’s address on January 5 to a
joint session of Congress where he requested “economic and military assistance to friendly
Middle East states” and advance authorization for “the use of American military forces to
thwart aggression or head off communist subversion”).
335 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 527 (“Eisenhower . . . was, therefore, asking Congress to
agree in advance to military action in support of the territorial integrity and political
independence of states in the Middle East.”).
336 For an excellent discussion of Foreign States and their potential claims under the
United States Constitution, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution,
73 VA. L. REV. 483, 495-96 (1987) (“In foreign affairs cases, as elsewhere, the federal courts
have forged a doctrine favoring consistent application of constitutional norms even when the
claimant is nontraditional—a foreigner rather than a citizen, or a juridical person rather than
a natural one.”).
337 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 527-28 (asserting that the Eisenhower Doctrine was
motivated by fears of “International Communism” and Russia’s focus on “power politics” in
the Middle East).
338 JOHNSON, supra note 331, at 70 (2006).
339 Id. at 71; see also WOOLLACOTT; supra note 1, at 129-48 (analyzing the effects of the
Suez war on the wars fought by the U.S. in Iraq in the 1990s and the 21 century).
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as messy as it is, may be superior to a fast, decisive and vigorous unitary
decision-making? Griffin and Zeisberg’s recommendations concerning
increasing accountability and better interaction between the two branches of
the government are useful for assessing the effort to avoid a war as well as for
evaluating a decision to go to war.340
CONCLUSION
What constitutional lessons may be drawn from the Suez War and its
aftermath? Certainly it appears to have been a war to make more wars. After
the Suez events each of the belligerents engaged in many a war, which they
were mostly, but not always, careful to characterize as an “armed conflict” not
rising to the level of war. The brakes, checks and balances available in the
belligerents’ constitutional regimes as well as the compromises between
morality and power embedded in the Charter of the United Nations were
honored in the breach. The Suez war was one of the major events in the 1950s
that chilled the aspirations of the post war era and permitted a manipulable and
manipulated conception of law—both international and domestic—to grow. It
thus served to encourage, rather than deter, more wars.
The United States while playing the role of Diplomat in Chief almost got
involved in a war as a result of the crisis, and in the aftermath it got more and
more tangled in the periodic conflagrations in the Middle East.341 Soon enough
the United States stepped into the French boots and led the bloody war in
Vietnam.342
Each of the parties to the Suez story had a previously set legal process,
which governed the decision to engage in military conflicts. No party engaged
in a bona fide implementation of this process. Secrecy played a major part in
the belligerents’ decision to go to war. The fragile separation between the civil
and military chain of command greatly shaped France’s decision to go to war.
Given the close relationship between the French and Israeli military command,
France also had a decisive influence on the Israeli decision to go to war. The
concentration of power in the hands of the Israeli prime minister and the lack

340

See GRIFFIN, supra note 2, at 4 (explaining the importance of accountability and
institutional structures with war powers because of the risk of “policy catastrophe” if the
nation goes to war without “the meaningful deliberation and consent of the legislative and
executive branches of government”); ZEISBERG, supra note 3, at 18 (“I argue that the
branches’ powerful governance and epistemic capacities can be used to support
constructions of constitutional war powers that are well adapted to the security context of
their own time.”).
341 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 286 (“Eisenhower’s historic contribution following the
Suez crisis was the commitment of the United States to maintaining the stability and
security of the Middle East.”).
342 See JOHNSON, supra note 331, at 67 (discussing the evolution of the executive’s power
as both events in the Middle East under Eisenhower and the Vietnam War in 1964
“established a precedent for significantly eroding the legislative role in intentional affairs”).
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of compartmentalization between Israeli civil and military command also
propelled Israel to abide by the French plan to assign to Israel the role of
aggressor. In defense of Israel, one may point to the fact that the Israeli
leadership had no tradition to draw on, and the example it was getting from its
two senior partners was that constitutional arrangements may and should be
circumvented in order to achieve goals determined by realpolitik. Even the
United States, whose President proclaimed devotion to morality and the rule of
law, appeared to have been willing to turn a blind eye to the honored principles
had the belligerents shown more resolve and proficiency in achieving their
goals. It is also interesting to reflect on the complex web inside the executive
branch. The three prime ministers who came together to plan the war engaged
in massive compartmentalization inside their cabinets, marginalizing their
ministeries of foreign affairs and silencing the voice of diplomacy.343
The paradigm of executive control to determine whether or not to go to war
appears to have been solidly entrenched among all the partners to the conflict,
regardless of what their Constitution or constitutional traditions required.344

343 Christian Pineau was an exception. See KYLE, supra note 17, at 316 (highlighting
Christian Pineau’s contributions to the secret negotiations at Sèvres preceding the Suez
Crisis). However, he too made sure to keep the French ministry of foreign affairs in the
dark. See id. at 331 (describing the small number of French government officials who knew
about France’s plan and the Sèvres agreement, which meant that “the entire Quai d’Orsay
[France’s foreign ministry] was cut out of the circuit of those who knew about Sѐvres”). By
contrast, the U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles was actively involved in the Suez
Crisis. NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 203 (highlighting Dulles’ active role as he attempted to
prevent the Suez Crisis and action once the Crisis began). However, he fell ill and was not
as influential or deft as he could have been had he been in good health. See id. at 232-33
(describing Dulles cancer treatments and hospitalization in November 1956).
344 Finally, one should ask what significance should attach to “the body”—the body
politic, the body social, and the personal body of the politicians (men, women, healthy, sick,
handsome, ugly, young, old, sexy, vulnerable, experienced, and manipulative) in the
conflicts and intrigues which formed the Suez crisis. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden
was extremely ill from the period leading to the Suez invasion until his resignation a few
weeks later. See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 268 (“By November 19, rumors abounded that
Anthony Eden was ill.”). So was Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who was
confined to bed all through the week of the actual invasion. See KYLE, supra note 17, at 344
(“Ben-Gurion was . . . looking tired, his voice weak and his temperature high.”). French
Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, another central player, was also ill. British Foreign
Minister Selwyn Lloyd was “exhausted and confused.” See id. at 302 (“I have seldom seen .
. . a man more confused and unhappy than Lloyd was on that occasion.”). U.S. Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles was fighting cancer, and in November, 1956, was hospitalized. See
NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 233 (describing Dulles cancer treatment on Saturday November 3
where “the surgeons at Walter Reed Hospital had removed a cancerous tumor from the
secretary’s colon”). Perhaps Dulles would have behaved differently if he were not so ill.
How did the condition of these important figures affect their decision-making processes?
Should domestic constitutional law, shaping the body politic, be aware of or ignore these
conditions?What should one make of the fact that the British considered France to be “’the
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But one should ask if matters were likely to be fundamentally different had
the respective Parliaments been more genuinely involved, and would a
different result be more likely? Certainly not in the case of France and Israel
where public opinion (perhaps shaped by the Executive, which brings us to the
question of a free press and freedom of expression in democracies) leaned
quite heavily in favor of war.345 Even in England, it is not clear that Anthony
Eden would have been so solidly defeated had the military operations been
carried out successfully within the time frame originally contemplated.346
And yet, the decades since the Suez War have edged toward a change of
paradigm. The legislative branches of all four countries have made a serious
effort to change the norms and give legislative deliberation more influence
over the decision to go to war.347 Only Israel lags behind, its parliament not yet
sick man’ of Europe,” and that Eisenhower called France a “helpless, hopeless mass of
protoplasm”? See William I. Hitchcock, Crisis and Modernization in the Fourth Republic:
From Suez to Rome, in CRISIS AND RENEWAL IN FRANCE, 1918-1962, at 222 (Kenneth Moure
& Martin S. Alexander eds., 2002).
In the British Parliament, following the invasion, members protested that John Bull (symbol
of Great Britain) was seduced by Marianne (symbol of France). I suggest that a role reversal
had occurred in the French-Israeli relations. See KYLE, supra note 17, at 293. There, France
played not the beguiling woman, but rather the powerful seductive older male to the
vulnerable and needy Israeli maiden. France offered Israel material and moral support (in
this order) in exchange for compliance and obedience. See id. at 218 (“[A] stream of French
landing-craft was delivering the tanks, planes and guns which the Israelis desperately
needed in secret landings at dead of night, often attended by Ben-Gurion and a few
especially privileged observers.”). French arms, in large quantities, were the glittering
diamonds that intoxicated Israel and encouraged it to perform the role assigned to it by the
European power. See id. (detailing political and military interactions between France and
Israel culminating in France delivering Israel needed military supplies). Perhaps Prime
Minister David Ben-Gurion understood this dynamic at some level, and this is the reason
why he developed a high fever as Israeli troops charged into Egypt. See id. at 344
(describing Ben-Gurion’s health as he was “[o]bviously suffering from fever”). This was not
a good situation for a proud man to find himself in.
345 See TURNER, supra note 17, at 259 (“The French legislature passed a vote of
confidence in Mollet, and he boldly defended the Suez operation, linking it with the need to
combat terrorists in French Algeria and to protect western democracy against dictators like
Nasser.”).
346 See id. at 288-89 (“Eden’s view was that the real mistakes occurred after the
ceasefire, not before it, and they occurred because other world leaders acted in an
unexpected and unreasonable manner.”).
347 Compare War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012) (“It is the purpose of this
chapter to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure
that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.”), and Authorization for Use of
Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541) (“That the
President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”), with supra note 60 and
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confident enough to assert a more active role in matters of security because it
is fearful of compromising security imperatives. Still, a review of the action
taken by the legislatures of all countries involved, even Israel, reflects
recognition that leaving matters to an unregulated executive decision is a bad
way to guarantee the well being of the country. Even though Griffin and
Zeisberg address only the U.S. constitutional regime, their books reflect this
more general trend. The paradigm is in the process of shifting, but what a
genuine change will look like and whether it will happen is yet unclear.

accompanying text (explaining that within the United Kingdom, “[i]issues related to war
have been long recognized as royal prerogatives, solidly vested in the hands of the executive
(the crown)”), and supra notes 111, 119-120 and accompanying text (exploring France’s
lack of a “constitutional check on a trigger happy executive” who may circumvent
constitutional requirements of a declaration of war ).

